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Accounting Aspects of Pricing in
Negotiated Contracts
H. W. Bordner, CPA, Ass't Comptroller, Defense Dept.
To discuss the accounting aspects of pricing negotiated contracts, it is 
necessary to begin with a definition of a 
negotiated contract. Basically a negotiated 
contract is any contract which is not priced 
upon the basis of advertising and com­
petitive bidding, as normally required in 
government procurement. However, there 
are various types of negotiated contracts, 
in addition to ordinary, firm fixed-price 
contracts, to meet special needs, such as 
the cost-reimbursement type, the price- 
redetermination type, and the incentive 
type. These will be discussed later.
It is important to understand the re­
lationship of contract price negotiation and 
the area of items exempt from over-all 
price control to appreciate some of the 
problems involved in price negotiations. In 
practice there is no simple relation be­
tween these two things although there is 
some correlation; the area of negotiated 
contracts is not identified exactly with 
the area of products exempt from price 
control.
Basically, there have been exempted 
from the area of price control those goods 
having exclusively a military use, to­
gether with all the components and parts 
designed solely for use in production of 
such military end-items.
The fact that any commodity is sub­
ject to a determinable price ceiling does 
not mean that contracts will be placed 
by the Department of Defense on the 
basis of such ceilings. It is a primary re­
sponsibility of procurement officers to ob­
tain the lowest possible prices. They 
merely cannot pay in excess of price ceil­
ings for items subject to price control, 
either under advertising for bids or under 
negotiated contracts.
The Department of Defense has not 
abandoned the policy of advertising and 
obtaining competitive bids as the most de­
sirable procurement process, although in 
many areas it has been found necessary 
to resort to the more extensive use of 
negotiated contracts. However, as pro­
vided by the Armed Services Procurement 
Act the use of negotiated contracts has 
been common, even during normal times. 
For example, today it still is common 
practice to obtain autos and auto trucks 
through advertising and competitive bid­
ding, including both those having standard 
specifications which are subject to price 
control, and combat vehicles, which are 
exempt from price control.
There have been occasions when ad­
vertising has been used, but did not bring 
forth bids that were considered to be 
really competitive. In such cases the bids 
have all been thrown out, and the military 
departments have proceeded to negotiate 
for lower prices with those submitting 
bids. Sometimes this procedure has not 
been fully understood, and there has 
been some confusion in the minds of the 
contractors concerned, with consequent 
criticism of this process. This misunder­
standing arises from failure to understand 
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that the competitive bidding process was 
discarded as unsuccessful before com­
mencing the negotiation process.
It is common practice where the bids 
have been thrown out to disclose one 
person’s bid to another in order to nego­
tiate lower contract prices. It does not 
seem to me that this is unethical so long 
as one contractor’s cost estimates are not 
disclosed to another. No contractor is 
compelled to take a government contract 
so long as he has materials and a good 
market for his products, and in such cases 
the procurement officer often finds it dif­
ficult to negotiate reasonable prices. He 
needs to use every fair means at his dis­
posal to attain this objective.
In negotiating contract prices, including 
prices for those items subject to price 
control, cost accounting plays an important 
part, but there are other means, useful 
in different degree in different cases, for 
the procurement officers’ use in obtaining 
reasonable prices. Without going into 
these exhaustively, a few may be men­
tioned. Certain products, such as clothing, 
have been produced in plants operated by 
the military departments, under pilot op­
erations, for the purposes of aiding pro­
duction design, especially from the stand­
point of production speed and economy, 
and of obtaining a thorough knowledge 
of manufacturing costs. In other instances, 
relative price quotations obtained inform­
ally from several sources, knowledge of a 
contractor’s previous prices, or the con­
tinuous price history of an item, provide 
useful information. It is not the purpose 
here to deal with all the tools a con­
tracting officer has at his disposal for 
purposes of contract negotiation, but 
merely to indicate that tools other than 
cost accounting are used.
Cost accounting has utility in assisting 
a contracting officer to negotiate prices in 
proportion to the failure of all other 
means. Sometimes it provides almost a 
sole basis for price determination, but in 
other cases it provides only one factor of 
several. This use of accounting in pricing 
negotiated contracts is the aspect of great­
est interest to accountants.
One should never lose sight of the fact 
that a negotiated price must provide for 
a profit to a contractor as well as for a 
return of his costs. The entire price 
should be such as to provide the greatest 
incentive to a contractor to reduce his 
costs and his over-all prices. Other ob­
jectives which must be solved in negotiat­
ing contracts include quality of product, 
attainment of speed of delivery required, 
and providing continuity of operation of 
key facilities so they will be available in 
event of all-out mobilization.
There has been a dearth of written 
material on the subject of profit allow­
ances. More has been written on this 
subject in connection with renegotiation of 
contracts than with respect to initial con­
tract pricing. However, all that has been 
said with respect to the factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonable­
ness of over-all profits in renegotiation ap­
plies also in the initial pricing of individual 
contracts. You will recall that these fac­
tors, according to the Renegotiation Act, 
include interest on the capital investment; 
allowance for risks of loss of capital, cost 
changes, product guarantees, etc.; reward 
for efficiency and low production costs; 
complexity of the product; the character 
of the industry, with special reference to 
value added in production to the cost of 
the materials, as distinguished from mere 
merchandising; and the contractor’s gen­
eral production and delivery performance. 
The combination of these factors in any 
individual instance is an extremely dif­
ficult matter and can never be made the 
basis of formula. The complexity of this 
problem of profit allowances explains why 
the Department of Defense has not yet 
published Section XVI of the Armed Serv­
ices Procurement Regulations on this all- 
important subject for the information of 
contractors, as well as for the guidance 
of contracting officers.
At this point I wish to point out that 
one essential principle in initial pricing 
of negotiated contracts is that each con­
tract should stand on its own feet. If a 
contractor is to be compensated for risk­
taking at all, there should be no con­
sideration at the time of making a new 
contract for compensating him for a loss 
sustained on some previous contract.
It is sometimes wondered by the public 
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whether it would not be simpler and more 
economical for the government to permit 
loose initial pricing practices and then 
force more attention on the recovery of 
excessive profits in renegotiation. The De­
partment of Defense opposes this view, as 
does the Congress. Letting down the bars 
in such a manner in the initial pricing 
process would contribute to great laxity 
in production practices with waste and 
extravagance that would only result in 
greater net prices to the government, even 
after renegotiation. The process of initial 
pricing must be approached with sincerity 
and earnestness in every contract negotia­
tion.
The outright, firm fixed-price contract 
is favored by the Department of Defense 
over other types of negotiated contracts. 
However, where the lack of production or 
cost experience of a contractor is inad­
equate to permit the initial determination 
of a fixed price or where the existence of 
other large indeterminate risks would re­
quire otherwise the allowance of a sub­
stantial element of contingencies to com­
pensate for the risk, the government stands 
ready and prefers to take the risk through 
offering a cost-reimbursement type of con­
tract or a price-redetermination clause un­
der a contract nominally called a fixed- 
price contract.
One factor in the negotiation of the out­
right, firm fixed-price contract is a break­
down of a contractor’s cost estimates. 
Wherever a contractor has a standard cost 
system, the use of such standards based 
upon bills of material and time studies 
are especially valuable. Even where the 
method of making cost estimates is not 
related to a standard cost system, the 
reliability of the cost estimates may not 
be great unless the estimates have been 
made with the use of bills of materials 
and time studies. Actual cost experience 
under job-cost or process-cost accounting 
systems have their place where standard 
costs are not available, although it will 
be appreciated that such costs do not 
provide as much assurance as to their 
reasonableness as do standard costs.
The price-redetermination clause per­
mits subsequent adjustment of an initial 
fixed price based upon the attainment of 
actual cost experience during performance 
of the contract. Such redeterminations may 
be based upon analyses of actual cost at 
more than one stage during the contract. 
In general, it is provided that price re­
determination always result in price re­
ductions, but it is possible by specific 
contract terms to provide for increases as 
well. Therefore, it is a usual practice to 
set the initial price high enough to take 
care of all contingencies.
It will be appreciated that a price-re- 
determination arrangement eliminates cer­
tain risks which would be sustained under 
a firm fixed-price contract. To this extent 
the contractor is not entitled under a 
price-redetermination clause to as large a 
profit allowance as a factor in determin­
ing the entire price. In this connection 
the timing of redetermination is significant 
in reducing the risk; for example, a 
price redetermination near the time of 
completion of the contract would remove 
practically all risks.
Price redetermination clauses are used 
very extensively today. They have tended 
to supersede the cost-plus-fixed-fee con­
tract. Although its objectives are the same 
as the cost-reimbursement type of contract, 
it has certain advantages. Among the ad­
vantages are greater flexibility in recog­
nizing and allowing for all factors that 
should be considered in determining a 
reasonable profit margin, and the reduc­
tion of contract auditing, with elimination 
of the power of the Comptroller General 
to make disallowances of contract costs 
because costs are merely one factor in the 
determination of the entire price by agree­
ment between the contractor and contract­
ing officer. From the standpoint of the 
government a disadvantage of the price- 
redetermination clause, as compared with 
the fixed-price contract, is that it reduces 
the bargaining power of the contracting 
officer to some extent.
In principle it should be noted that the 
use of historical costs in price redeter­
minations should be tempered to allow 
for predicted costs during the remainder 
of the contract, considering cost trends 
and all the production factors which will 
have a bearing upon subsequent costs. In 
this respect the use of the price-redetermi- 
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nation clause is different than the use of 
the cost-reimbursement type contract.
A modification of the price-redetermi­
nation clause to provide, in principle, cer­
tain incentives to contractors to reduce 
prices, based upon possible cost reduc­
tions, is the incentive-type contract. From 
the standpoint of the government, this 
type of contract depends for its success 
upon the predetermination of a reasonable 
cost “target,” because cost savings with 
respect to the target are shared by the 
government and the contractor. If the 
goal is set too high, a contractor will 
realize excessive profits not warranted by 
its actual cost performance. On the other 
hand, if the goal is set too low, while it 
may have the effect of creating pressure 
on the contractor for low costs, it may 
reward him inadequately for his efforts. 
The incentive-type contract requires, then, 
consideration of actual costs of produc­
tion upon completion of the contract, as 
well as the cost target before beginning 
the contract.
Least favored of all types of negotiated 
contracts is the cost-reimbursement type 
of contract, the principal form of which 
is known as the cost-plus-fixed-fee con­
tract, so familiar in World War II. Under 
this type of contract, the contractor re­
ceives a fee predetermined before the be­
ginning of the contract, usually based 
upon a percentage of estimated cost; it 
is not subject to increase. There is some 
tendency towards lack of flexibility in 
the allowance of fixed fees as compared 
with profit allowances under price-rede- 
termination clauses, and a much greater 
preoccupation with actual historical costs 
as a major factor in establishing the re­
imbursement to the contractor. On the 
other hand, there are some contractors 
who much prefer the cost-reimbursement 
type of contract to any other, because it 
provides definite assurance of the return 
of actual costs with the accompanying re­
duction of risks. It is a more or less gen­
eral practice of some large industrial 
corporations, who act as agents by con­
tract for the operation of certain govern­
ment-owned plants, to use a cost-reim­
bursement type of contract under which 
they receive management fees together 
with an allowance for all the actual op­
erating costs of the plants.
The Armed Services Procurement Reg­
ulations contain a Statement of Contract 
Cost Principles in Section XV. This state­
ment, however, is applicable only to cost­
reimbursement type contracts, including 
those with nonprofit institutions for re­
search and development work and with 
construction contractors, as well as supply 
and research contracts with manufacturing 
concerns. This statement has been criti­
cized, but it has been generally accepted 
by industry for the purpose for which it 
was intended.
However, there has been an unfortunate 
lack of a statement of contract cost prin­
ciples applicable to fixed-price contracts, 
including those containing price-redeter­
mination and incentive clauses. There have 
been allegations that contracting officers 
have used cost data supplied by contract 
auditors for use in negotiation of fixed- 
price contracts based exactly upon the 
cost principles stated in Section XV. Pos­
sibly this is unavoidable in the absence 
of complete written cost principles. In 
any event, the Department of Defense has 
accepted the need for a statement of con­
tract cost principles with respect to fixed- 
price contracts, and such a statement is 
now being prepared. Consideration will 
be given to a complete revision of Section 
XV, with the intent, if possible, of estab­
lishing one set of contract cost principles 
applicable to all types of negotiated con­
tracts.
I do not wish here to discuss contract 
cost principles in detail, but a few observa­
tions on this subject may be of interest.
We all subscribe to the principle that 
equity should prevail in the determina­
tion of costs, either estimated or actual, 
for pricing negotiated contracts. We also 
recognize there is an occasional contractor 
who is wasteful and extravagant accord­
ing to our standards, and we desire by 
contract to place some limits upon his 
costs where he is to be reimbursed on 
the basis of costs under any type of con­
tract. We believe the vast majority of 
well-run American corporations will agree 
with this principle, and, they will as tax­
payers, desire that the occasional offender 
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be kept in line and not overstep himself.
Contractors who have had experience 
with contract cost principles should rec­
ognize generally that the judgment of the 
individual management as to reasonable­
ness of cost items is not often questioned. 
However, based upon principle, there have 
been and are frequent relatively picayunish 
disallowances of small relative significance 
that offend the sense of equity of con­
tractors and result in criticism far out of 
proportion to the amounts involved.
We may also state that Section XV of 
the statement of contract cost principles 
is too rigid. It draws too sharp a line be­
tween those items of cost which are con­
sidered to be allowable and those which 
are considered to be unallowable. It must 
be recognized that this statement was pre­
pared solely for use with cost-reimburse­
ment type contracts which largely relate 
to products of a specialized nature for 
which the government is the sole customer. 
We recognize that the problems of cost­
ing standard commercial products, or 
items related thereto, for sale through 
normal commercial channels are different 
from the problems encountered in pricing 
products which are the subject of cost­
reimbursement-type, prime contracts. In 
practice, even without a statement of con­
tract cost principles, we believe these dif­
ferences are generally being recognized 
in pricing fixed-price contracts.
The foregoing comments all add up to 
the conclusion that the revised statement 
of contract cost principles should be more 
explicit with respect to the circumstances 
under which various elements of costs are 
considered to be allowable or unallowable. 
Reasons for unallowability should be 
clearly set forth to the public.
In connection with the establishment of 
a complete statement of contract cost prin­
ciples, the Department of Defense has con­
ferred and will continue to confer with 
and receive advice from one of the com­
mittees of the American Institute of Ac­
countants as well as committees from 
various other groups, including nonpro­
fessional trade associations. In this pro­
cess, you may be assured that the views 
of accountants and businessmen on the 
accounting aspects of pricing negotiated 
contracts will receive a full airing. We 
shall also confer with and ask advice of 
the General Accounting Office on this sub­
ject, but we recognize the ultimate respon­
sibility of the Department of Defense to 
adopt a statement that will be fair to both 
government and business and be proof 
against criticism from the public and the 
Congress, who have a vital interest in 
these matters.
It should be understood that the con­
tracting agencies of the federal govern­
ment have the power to make specific 
agreements with contractors regarding the 
items which are allowable as contract 
costs and the methods of allocation of 
contract costs to products subject to pric­
ing under negotiated contracts. To the 
extent possible, it is desirable that the 
contract terms be specific as to cost prin­
ciples. Only to the extent they are not 
specific can there be later disagreement 
between the parties or with representatives 
of the General Accounting Office in exer­
cising their power to review contract pay­
ments.
I would like to close with a brief dis­
cussion of two important cost problems 
presently facing us.
Since World War II, there has gradually 
grown the practice, in the determination 
of costs under cost-reimbursement-type 
contracts, intended to simplify and ex­
pedite reimbursements, of a predetermina­
tion by negotiation of overhead rates. In 
practice, it has been found that such 
negotiations have been time-consuming 
and expensive, so that there is some ques­
tion regarding the simplicity of the prac­
tice. Moreover, the policy has recently 
been attacked on the basis that the pre­
determination of overhead rates has been 
unfair and unreasonable from the stand­
point of the government because (I) in 
many instances actual overhead rates un­
der revised schedules of production have 
been less than those established, and (2) 
that once overhead rates are predetermined 
with respect to direct labor, there is a 
positive incentive to contractors to be in­
efficient in the use of direct labor in the 
same manner that the former cost-plus-a- 
percentage-of-cost contract was a positive 
incentive to contractors to increase their 
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aggregate costs. It is possible that the use 
of predetermined overhead rates may be 
suspended.
I have been asked to comment on the 
present status of amortization of emer­
gency facilities as an allowable item of 
contract cost. When consideration was first 
given to this matter, it was realized that 
the certificates had been issued for nec­
essary expansion of practically all types of 
American industry, including businesses 
whose products’ selling prices are limited 
by price controls, those whose selling 
prices are subject to regulation, such as 
railroads and electric light and power 
companies, and those engaged in the pro­
duction of military end-items. Therefore, 
it was well understood that it would be 
impossible to lay down a single rule ap­
plicable to all such kinds of operations.
After many discussions with various 
agencies of the Government, on 14 August 
1951, the Director of Defense Mobilization, 
Mr. Charles E. Wilson, issued Defense 
Mobilization Order No. 11 making it per­
missive, but not mandatory, to allow ac­
celerated amortization as an item of con­
tract cost to the extent that such 
amortization is based upon excluding the 
portion of the cost of facilities estimated 
to be fairly allocable to the post-emergency 
period. Simultaneously, he suspended the 
issuance of certificates of necessity for 
sixty days, with certain exceptions, and 
asked for a survey by the Defense Pro­
duction Administration of the practices in 
issuance of certificates of necessity, in­
cluding a study in cooperation with the 
procurement agencies, of certificates pre­
viously issued from the standpoint of de­
termining the portion of the cost of the 
facilities that should be allowable as costs 
under negotiated contracts. This determin­
ation was to be made without intent to 
revise the amounts certified for tax pur­
poses. On the basis of the survey, pro­
cedures were to be established for similar 
determinations with respect to certificates 
to be issued in the future.
The methods and the degree of applica­
cation of these principles have not as yet 
been definitely determined. However, the 
Administrator of the Defense Production 
Administration recently appointed a com­
mittee composed principally of repre­
sentatives of business for the purpose 
of making recommendations on this sub­
ject. It is hoped that through the efforts 
of this committee principles will be formu­
lated in implementation of the directive.
It was natural that the question should 
be raised as to the practicability of mak­
ing estimates of loss of economic useful­
ness of emergency facilities applicable 
to the emergency period. While, in our 
opinion, such estimates can and should 
be made, it cannot be denied that they 
require the exercise of a high degree of 
judgment. Those who doubt that estimates 
of loss of economic usefulness can be 
fairly determined would prefer to allow 
only normal depreciation on such facilities 
in contract pricing, leaving contractors to 
receive any additional recoveries on emer­
gency facilities through tax savings on 
that portion of the amortization which is 
in excess of normal depreciation. This 
theory, in our opinion, is unsound in that 
it fails to take into consideration the 
fact that full recovery of loss of economic 
usefulness can only be effected if amortiza­
tion of emergency facilities is allowed as 
an element of cost in contract pricing. 
Accountants familiar with the subject will 
be thoroughly in accord with this state­
ment.
Undoubtedly, most contractors who 
sought and obtained certificates of neces­
sity had an eye on the Renegotiation Act 
of 1951, as well as the Revenue Act, in 
making decisions relative to the acquisi­
tion of emergency facilities under certifi­
cates. The Renegotiation Act of 1951, 
consistent with the practice in World War 
II, provided for the allowance of amor­
tization as an element of cost of renego­
tiable business upon the same basis as 
allowable for tax purposes. However, this 
provision of the Renegotiation Act may 
be amended, by the so-called Eberharter 
Amendment now being considered, to pro­
vide a limitation on the allowance of 
amortization based upon the same stand­
ard as provided in Mr. Wilson’s directive 
on initial contract pricing. Such uniformity 
would be desirable, provided the Wilson 
directive is actually implemented in initial 
contract pricing.
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Renegotiating Under
The 1951 Act
John T. Koehler, Chairman, Renegotiation Board
I appear before you this afternoon charged with the task of discussing 
“contract renegotiation.” In view of my 
limited knowledge of the subject, I look 
upon this task with a considerable amount 
of controlled enthusiasm and can only hope 
that, after I have finished, you will not 
charge me with having accepted your 
hospitality under false pretenses.
I moved into my present job on Wednes­
day last from the Navy Department where, 
for the past two and a half years, I have 
been Assistant Secretary in charge of all 
procurement and production programs. In 
this assignment, I have had ample oppor­
tunity to deal directly with industry and I 
learned to appreciate the part industry 
has played, and must continue to play, in 
the defense of the nation.
We Americans are indeed fortunate that 
our tremendous industrial power permits 
us to produce great quantities of 
highly complicated and scientific equip­
ment and that it permits us to provide 
our servicemen with the finest equipment in 
the world and to make up in firepower, 
what we lack in manpower.
It is hardly necessary to remind you that 
our industrial power depends, for its very 
existence, on a strong, vigorous, and healthy 
national economy and that that econo­
my depends, in part, upon a careful hus­
banding of our national resources. Ever 
since June 1950, our governmental expend­
itures for military purposes have been 
increasing at a rapid rate. For the fiscal 
year ended June 30, 1951, the total De­
partment of Defense obligations exceeded 
49 billion dollars of which 35.3 billion 
dollars covered procurement obligations 
for major equipment, supplies, military 
construction, and expansion of production 
facilities. For. the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1952, these defense obligations, includ­
ing military construction, will exceed 60 
billion dollars and military orders are cur­
rently being placed at a rate in excess of 
one billion dollars a week.
To add to the magnitude of our task, 
this rapidly expanding defense production 
program is not, and cannot be, evenly 
distributed throughout the country. It is 
most highly concentrated in aircraft, com­
bat vehicles, electronic equipment, some 
vessel construction, new weapons such as 
guided missiles, and other items the prime 
contracts for which must go to contractors 
located, in the main, in areas of industrial 
concentration. By subcontracting and other 
means, we must do what we can to mini­
mize this concentration. We must guard 
against creating new facilities in cases 
where existing facilities are able to carry 
the load; we must assure a sufficient sup­
ply of machine tools, production facilities, 
and critical materials to our manufacturers 
if the production rate of end items is to be 
maintained at a pace consistent with se­
curity requirements. Finally, but by no 
means least important, we must do what 
we can to assure small business a fair 
percentage of military procurement in 
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order that we may have as broad an 
industrial base as possible.
Up to this point, I have been speaking 
more as a government official charged with 
procurement responsibilities than as a 
Member of the Renegotiation Board. How­
ever, I hope you will agree with me that, 
if confined to its proper sphere, renegotia­
tion can and should play an important part 
in government procurement of military 
materiel during war and during periods 
of preparedness such as face us now. In 
its statement of policy in the Renegotiation 
Act of 1951, Congress declared that the 
sound execution of the National Defense 
Program requires the elimination of ex­
cessive profits made from contracts made 
with the United States and from related 
subcontracts and that such excessive profits 
be eliminated in accordance with the pro­
visions of the Act.
I shall not take up your time with a 
consideration of previous renegotiation 
legislation since I am sure that all of you 
are thoroughly familiar with it. I believe 
that I can summarize our past experience 
in renegotiation by saying that, by and 
large, an experiment which began in 1942 
thoroughly proved its worth during the 
years of World War II. It has been esti­
mated that determinations of excessive 
profits amounting to over eleven billion dol­
lars were made during the effective period 
of the 1942 Act. In addition to these direct 
savings, renegotiation exercised a substan­
tial influence, which cannot be calculated 
in dollars, in bringing about lower prices 
for Armed Services procurement while 
civilian prices were slowly rising.
One of the distinguishing features of 
renegotiation is that each individual con­
tractor is renegotiated on the basis of the 
merits of his own particular case. There 
is no fixed base for classes or types of 
industry or for industry in general, but the 
same uniform standard factors are applied 
to each of the individual cases. In this con­
nection, I would like to call your atten­
tion to the following statement which ap­
peared in the Military Renegotiation 
Regulations for the 1948 Act:
“In general, reasonable profits should be 
determined by over-all evaluation of the 
particular factors present without limita­
tion or restriction by any fixed formula with 
respect to rate of profit, or otherwise. Re­
negotiation proceedings should not result 
in a profit based on the principle of a 
percentage of cost. Contractors who sell 
at lower prices and produce at lower costs 
through good management, improved 
methods of production, close control of 
expenditures, and careful purchasing will 
receive a more favorable determination 
than those who do not. Such favorable or 
unfavorable determination will be re­
flected in the profits allowed to be re­
tained by the contractor or subcontractor 
as nonexcessive. Claims of a contractor for 
favorable consideration must be supported 
by established facts, analyses, and ap­
propriate comparisons.”
I now come to a consideration of the 
1951 Act and I hope you will forgive me 
if I confine my remarks to a resume of 
statutory provisions and do not venture 
into the realm of predicting broad policy. 
I might add, in passing, that the ink was 
hardly dry on our commissions before 
advice began rolling in but, to date, the 
only official action the Board has taken 
is to grant an extension of time to March 
1, 1952 for filing the financial statements 
required by Section 105(e) (1) of the Act 
to all persons having fiscal years ending 
prior to November 30, 1951.
But to return to the Act, the Renegotia­
tion Act of 1951 was approved on March 
23, 1951 and provides for the renegotia­
tion of certain contracts made with the 
United States in the course of the execu­
tion of the national defense program in 
order to eliminate excessive profits. The 
principal provisions are summarized as 
follows:
The Renegotiation Board is established 
as an independent executive establishment 
consisting of five members appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
The principal office of the Board must be 
in the District of Columbia. For the first 
time, therefore, we have a Board which is 
wholly independent of those agencies of 
government charged with contract negotia­
tion. I speak for all members of the Board 
when I say we fully recognize the impor­
tance of this provision. It has often been 
said that “renegotiation is the opposite 
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side of the coin of negotiation.” I cannot 
accept that statement. It is true that there 
must be close liaison between procurement 
personnel and renegotiation personnel but 
that both groups should report to a com­
mon superior who has procurement re­
sponsibilities is, in my opinion, an un­
sound concept. Congress has taken the 
same view for, should he Board decide to 
delegate any of its authority, such delega­
tion may not be to any person engaged in 
procurement or in the supervision of 
procurement.
The Act applies to: (1) receipts and 
accruals on or after January 1, 1951 from 
contracts and related subcontracts with the 
military departments, the Department of 
Commerce, the General Services Adminis­
tration, the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
the Canal Zone Government, the Panama 
Canal Company, and the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency, and (2) to receipts 
and accruals from contracts and related 
subcontracts with such other agencies 
performing defense functions as the Presi­
dent may designate. The Act does not ap­
ply, however, to receipts and accruals 
attributable to performance prior to July 
1, 1950 under contracts and subcontracts 
which were not subject to the Renegotia­
tion Act of 1948. (By an Executive Order 
dated June 27, 1951 the President desig­
nated the following additional “Depart­
ments”: The Federal Civil Defense 
Administration, the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and the United States 
Coast Guard. The provisions of the Act 
are applicable to all contracts with each 
of these agencies named in the Order and 
to related subcontracts, to the extent of 
the amounts received or accrued by a con­
tractor or subcontractor on or after the 
first day of July, 1951.)
Contracts which the Board determines 
do not have a direct and immediate con­
nection with the national defense are 
mandatorily exempt and the Board’s reg­
ulations and determinations in this regard 
shall not be subject to review or redeter­
mination by any court or other agency. 
The Act applies to all contracts falling 
within its terms, and such contracts shall 
contain stipulations consenting to the 
elimination of excessive profits through 
renegotiation. It does not apply to receipts 
and accruals attributable to performance 
after December 31, 1953; nor to certain 
types of contracts specifically exempted 
from the Act, or granted exemption by the 
Board, which exemptions may be granted 
both individually and by general classes 
or types.
A contractor or subcontractor having 
less than $250,000, and certain subcontrac­
tors such as brokers or sales representa­
tives having less than $25,000, of yearly 
renegotiable business shall not be renego­
tiated under the Act. If the noted amounts 
are exceeded, the amount of profits that 
may be eliminated under renegotiation 
cannot be greater than the amount of such 
excess. In computing the aggregate of re­
ceipts and accurals of contractors under 
common control, intercompany sales shall 
be eliminated.
Every holder of contracts or subcon­
tracts subject to the Act shall file with the 
Board, on or before the beginning of the 
fourth calendar month following the end 
of the contractor’s fiscal year, a financial 
statement in such form as the Board shall, 
by regulation, prescribe. In addition, the 
contractor must furnish such other infor­
mation, records and/or data as may be 
determined by the Board to be necessary. 
A penalty of $10,000 and/or one year’s 
imprisonment is provided for wilful mis­
representation or failure to comply. The 
Board also shall, have the power to audit 
the books and records of subject contrac­
tors and subcontractors.
In determining excessive profits, the 
Board must give favorable recognition to 
the efficiency of the contractor, and in 
addition must consider the following fac­
tors: reasonableness of costs and profits 
(with particular regard to volume of pro­
duction and comparison of war and peace­
time products), the net worth (with par­
ticular regard to the amount and source of 
public and private capital employed), con­
tribution to the defense effort, the extent of 
risk assumed, the character of the busi­
ness, and such other factors (to be pub­
lished by the Board) as public interest and 
fair dealing may require. All allowable 
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Federal income tax deductions and exclu­
sions shall, to the extent allocable, be al­
lowed as items of cost, including any 
excess of costs paid or incurred in the 
preceding fiscal year over the amount of 
receipts or accruals subject to the Act 
which were received or accrued in such 
preceding fiscal year, but only to the 
extent that such excess is not attributable 
to the gross inefficiency of the contractor. 
No loss so incurred in any fiscal year end­
ing prior to January 1, 1951, may be 
carried forward.
Renegotiation proceedings will be com­
menced by the mailing of notice to that 
effect to the contractor by registered mail. 
The Board will endeavor to make an 
agreement with the contractor with re­
spect to the elimination of excessive profits. 
If no such agreement is reached, the Board 
shall issue an order determining the 
amount, if any, of excessive profits, notify 
the contractor thereof and, if the con­
tractor requests it, furnish a statement of 
the facts used as a basis for the determina­
tion and its reasons therefor. Determina­
tions shall be based on the aggregate of 
receipts and accruals during the fiscal year 
or other agreed period under contracts 
held by the contractors, except that con­
tracts may be treated separately on request.
By agreement with any contractor, the 
Board may in its discretion conduct re­
negotiation of two or more related contrac­
tors on a consolidated basis. Renegotiation 
must be conducted on a consolidated basis 
with a parent and its subsidiary corpora­
tion if all the corporations included in 
such affiliated groups request renegotiation 
on such basis and consent to such regula­
tions as the Board shall prescribe, includ­
ing regulations for determining the amount 
of excessive profits allocable, for tax credit 
purposes, to each corporation of the affil­
iated group.
After an agreement or order for the 
elimination of excessive profits is made, the 
Board shall direct the appropriate agency 
head to eliminate the excessive profits by 
reductions in amounts payable under con­
tracts otherwise due the contractors; or 
by directing Government contractors, and 
subcontractors thereunder, to withhold 
amounts due to any contractor or subcon­
tractor having excessive profits to be 
eliminated by suit; or by any combination 
of such methods. The Board has the 
power to extend the time for payment of 
sums due under an agreement or order. 
Protection is provided for assignees of 
subject contracts against withholding for 
renegotiation liability of the assignors by 
limiting such action to the extent provided 
in the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 
as now or hereafter amended. Banks and 
other financing institutions to which any 
subcontracts are assigned are also protect­
ed against withholding or recovery.
The Act provides for a period of limita­
tion—the contractor is discharged from 
all liabilities for excessive profits for a 
given fiscal year if renegotiation proceed­
ings are not commenced within one year 
after the filing of the financial statement 
required to be filed with respect to such 
fiscal year; or if an agreement or order 
is not made within two years following the 
commencement of the renegotiation pro­
ceeding. To this there are two exceptions: 
the two-year period may be extended by 
mutual agreement and it does not apply 
to review of an order by the Board if the 
order is made within the two-year period.
Within ninety days a petition may be 
filed in the Tax Court for a redetermina­
tion of excessive profits determined by the 
Board. This is a proceeding de novo to 
redetermine excessive profits, if any. The 
filing of such a petition shall stay the 
execution of the order, if the petitioner 
post sufficient bond within ten days. With 
certain limitations, interest on excessive 
profits shall accrue at the rate of four 
percent from the 30th day after the order 
of the Board or from the date fixed in an 
agreement for repayment. Interest at the 
same rate shall accrue in favor of the 
contractor on any amounts required to be 
refunded after redetermination by the Tax 
Court.
I believe that the foregoing will give 
you a broad overall picture of the present 
law. I have purposely omitted from this 
summary any discussion of technical 
changes in the World War II Act made to 
coordinate it with the provisions of the 
1951 Act. I have similarly omitted any dis­
cussion of the manner in which the transi­
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tion is to be made from the 1948 Act to 
the 1951 Act. I do not anticipate any 
substantial difficulty in this transition.
In conclusion, I should like you to con­
sider, if you will, one final fact which is all 
too often overlooked or bypassed by many 
of those who are not charged with the grave 
responsibility of carrying out a national 
program, whether it be in the field of re­
armament, economic stabilization, renego­
tiation, or in one of the many areas which 
have as their common goal the welfare and 
security of our people. If these programs 
are to succeed, their success depends, in 
large measure, upon affirmative answers to 
three questions, namely:
1. Is there a need for the program?
2. Is the plan for carrying it out a 
sound one? and
3. Can competent personnel be secured 
to do the job?
I am convinced that there is a real need 
for renegotiation in times like these and 
that the 1951 Act answers that need with 
sound legislation. I am also convinced that 
the Renegotiation Board will be unable to 
do an effective job unless it can secure the 
services of competent and objective people 
both in and out of government to ensure 
proper organization, effective implementa­
tion and fair and impartial results. It fol­
lows, as it always does, that the ‘answer 
ultimately lies in the capabilities and 
objectivity of the people who are called 
upon to do the job. I would like you to 
remember this fact when, in the near fu­
ture, I call upon representatives of your 
profession to drop their civilian pursuits 
for the time being in order to help us 
discharge our responsibilities.
Each of us in these perilous times must 
bear his fair share of the added burdens 
which international tensions have placed 
upon us. As you and I place upon our 
shoulders our fair share of the load, we 
can hold our heads high and close ranks 
with our fellow men, whether in or out 
of uniform, in our mutual defense of our 
beloved country.
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Economic Problems of
Mobilization
Roy Blough, Member, Council of Economic Advisors
As accountants in close touch with the operations of particular businesses, 
you are keenly aware of the problems that 
mobilization has brought and is bringing 
to them. Some of these problems, such as 
those involved in 5-year amortization, re­
negotiation, the excess-profits tax and 
price adjustments under price regulation 
orders, directly raise accounting problems. 
Others are more general problems of busi­
ness management. In the mobilization pe­
riod both the importance and difficulties of 
anticipating future developments with re­
spect to such matters as availability of 
materials, the desirability of expansion, 
probable defense contracts and the course 
of demand and prices are multiplied.
Broadly considered, the economic prob­
lems of mobilization of the nation as a 
whole consist of the sum total of the eco­
nomic problems of all the different con­
sumers, businesses, workers, farmers, in­
vestors, pensioners, etc. This does not 
imply, however, that if every individual 
and every business seeks to solve his own 
problems that it will all add up to a 
solution of the problems of the economy 
as a whole. For example, particular busi­
nesses may aggravate the national eco­
nomic problem of scarce materials by suc­
cessful efforts to accumulate and hoard 
them, while individuals and groups may 
aggravate the rise in prices by successful 
efforts to protect themselves against such 
a rise.
Accordingly, in the mobilization period, 
it is necessary to have collective action to 
restrain individuals and businesses from 
doing some of the things that come natur­
ally. Collective action means that the indi­
vidual is subjected to more or less re­
straint by his fellows; it is government of 
one kind or another. Some of our govern­
ment is carried on through organizations 
that are essentially private in character. 
Your own American Institute of Account­
ants is an example of such an organiza­
tion. It performs functions of a govern­
mental character with respect both to 
examinations for certification and to the 
setting of standards for accounting pro­
cedures.
Many kinds of restraints, however, can­
not safely be entrusted to private 
forms of collective action. The particular 
group may have interests that, if they were 
served, would be detrimental to the interest 
of the rest of the public. In general, if we 
must be governed, we want to be governed 
by people who, in the final analysis, de­
rive their power from the whole public 
and not by particular groups.
Successful government has two aspects. 
One is the intelligent design and execu­
tion of measures and policies appropriate 
to solve the problems giving rise to govern­
mental action. The other is the understand­
ing and support of a large majority of the 
population. Democratic governments can 
force rules down the throats of only a 
small recalcitrant minority.
Why not rely on automatic market forces 
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to achieve the economic goals of mobili­
zation? Why does partial mobilization 
require an enlargement of governmental 
economic programs? Do not these pro­
grams reflect the “grasping of power- 
hungry bureaucracies”? To answer the last 
question first, if I can trust my own obser­
vation, virtually no one in government likes 
controls. It does not stand to reason that 
businessmen of high prestige who go to 
Washington suddenly develop a fondness 
for controls that they formerly detested. 
Operating controls is a terrific nuisance for 
the Government and may boomerang polit­
ically at any time. Controls are adopted 
only when they clearly appear to be 
needed; they are imposed reluctantly, and 
for that reason sometimes belatedly.
The reason why automatic market forces 
are inadequate to achieve the economic 
goals of mobilization, thereby necessitat­
ing special governmental economic pro­
grams, is that the jolt of mobilization is too 
great for market forces to absorb. The 
result of the unassisted operation of these 
forces might well be a market chaos that 
would not only destroy economic stability, 
but seriously impair defense production as 
well.
The economic problems of mobilization 
that will not solve themselves without 
governmental action are of two kinds. The 
more basic one is the problem of securing 
an adequate volume and speed of defense 
production. The other problem which de­
rives from the first is that of maintaining a 
stable economy, particularly a stable price 
level during the period of build-up in de­
fense production . . .
The production problem of defense 
mobilization is to increase production of 
needed defense material and supporting 
productive capacity as rapidly as possible 
up to the levels required. To achieve this 
increase requires the devotion of resources 
—both physical resources and human re­
sources—to kinds of production that will 
have top importance in promoting the mili­
tary security of the nation. This mobiliza­
tion of production is partly a matter of 
increasing total production through the 
more effective use of resources that have 
been idle or not effectively employed. 
Mobilization also requires that resources 
be diverted from less important to more 
important kinds of production and par­
ticularly from production of civilian goods 
to production of military equipment and 
supplies. Big shifts must be made and 
made quickly. Making these production 
shifts creates another major economic 
problem, that of maintaining a stable econ­
omy. The more successful the effort speedi­
ly to enlarge necessary defense production 
the more intense the stabilization problems 
are likely to be. The drastic rechanneling 
of production introduces strains and dis­
tortions into the economy. Some persons 
find themselves luckily better off than they 
ever were before. Some, through no fault 
of their own, may suffer temporary unem­
ployment, or business loss, or be obliged 
to change jobs and move their families to 
strange surroundings.
The most universal and most dangerous 
type of economic instability that is likely 
to result from the rechanneling of produc­
tion is of course that spreading rise of 
prices which we call inflation.
The problem of inflation arises primarily 
because demand runs ahead of supply. 
Government is spending more and taking 
more of the total product, which leaves a 
smaller faction for consumers and private 
business. But consumers in the aggregate 
seek to spend more because a larger num­
ber of persons are working longer hours at 
generally higher wages and so have more 
income. Businesses seek to expand their 
plants and equipment and to build up 
inventories in order to do more business 
and make more profit. These buying pres­
sures are accentuated when persons and 
businesses spend their accumulated sav­
ings or borrowed funds. With spending 
thus tending to outrun supplies, inflation 
results unless measures are taken to pre­
vent it.
These, then, in brief are the two major 
economic problems of mobilization. What 
are the programs by which the government 
is endeavoring to solve them?
The first and most basic program for 
securing the required expansion of de­
fense production is the procurement pro­
gram, including the planning and schedul­
ing of production. Congress appropriates 
the funds and authorizes contracts for 
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goods and services need to clothe, feed, 
train, and equip the armed forces with 
adequate supplies of modern weapons, and 
to build a productive machine capable of 
a greatly expanded production of weapons, 
if required by all-out war. The military 
planners draw the specifications and the 
procurement officers let the contracts. The 
production is carried on by private indus­
try.
Ordering the goods is not all that is 
required to assure their prompt produc­
tion. Supplies of many materials and facili­
ties, especially metals and machine tools, 
are insufficient to fill all demands. To 
protect the procurement program from 
being halted or delayed by the competing 
demands of consumers and businesses, it 
has proved necessary to adopt priority and 
allocation programs. Defense production 
and essential civilian production are given 
the green light, but many other projects 
must be postponed. Making sound deci­
sions regarding essentiality is both an im­
portant and a difficult task. Not only 
profits and employment are at stake, but 
more important, the national welfare, pro­
ductive strength, and military safety.
Several measures are used to give posi­
tive encouragement to business to expand 
needed productive facilities. In some cases, 
long-term purchase contracts are granted 
to reduce risks of loss from plant expan­
sion. The privilege of depreciating prop­
erty for tax purposes over a 5-year period 
instead of over the longer periods which 
would otherwise be necessary had been 
granted for many new facilities. Loan 
programs provide Federal funds for im­
portant projects when private financing is 
not available. In some cases, subsidies have 
been used to get an expansion of mineral 
production that might not take place at 
market prices. A voluntary manpower pro­
gram encourages training, bringing new 
persons into the labor market, and placing 
them in jobs where they will be most use­
ful workers.
I turn now to the stabilization programs 
which relate largely to the prevention or 
mitigation of inflationary price increases 
of all kinds—raw material prices, whole­
sale prices, retail prices, wages, salaries, 
rents, and so on. Prices are very sensitive 
to the production shifts of the defense 
program and might become chaotic in the 
absence of stabilization programs. One 
man’s price is another man’s cost. Price 
rises in any important economic sector are 
likely to give rise to price rises elsewhere, 
and so on around, which is the inflationary 
spiral.
Prices are determined in large measure 
by the relation between supply and de­
mand. Price stabilization measures ac­
cordingly seek to restrain demand while 
at the same time increasing supply. The 
increase in supply by increased production 
helps furnish the goods which consumers 
and businesses desire. The more of a per­
son’s wants that are satisfied, the more 
willing he is likely to be to accept a re­
duction in the remainder of his expendi­
tures. However, defense production cannot 
cure the inflation problem, because the 
added production is reflected in larger in­
comes which consumers and businesses 
have to spend and thus increases demand.
The first and most basic stabilization 
program is taxation. During mobilization, 
more resources must be used by govern­
ment; that means that the public must use 
less resources. The government commands 
the resources by spending, so the public 
must spend less. Taxes pay for the govern­
ment spending and cut down the spending 
of business and consumers. Truly adequate 
taxes in a mobilization period would re­
duce private demand sufficient to offset 
increases in government demand. This 
would require at least a balanced budget 
and probably a large surplus.
This emphasis on taxation is not intend­
ed to imply that tax increases alone could 
be counted on to maintain economic stabil­
ity and prevent price rises during the mo­
bilization period. The record of July 1950 
to March 1951 showed clearly that in 
anticipation of the defense program large 
spurts of consumer and business buying as 
well as substantial price increases may 
take place even when the government’s 
budget is fully in balance or shows a sur­
plus. A balanced budget or preferably a 
surplus is, however, a foundation measure 
needed to support all stabilization pro­
grams.
Unfortunately that foundation is proving 
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very difficult to secure. The tax increases 
that are about to pass Congress likely will 
not prevent substantial deficit in the fiscal 
year 1952 and, unless heavily supple­
mented by later tax legislation, a large 
deficit in the fiscal year 1953. We are told 
that this tax bill scrapes the bottom of the 
tax barrel, and indeed that it has taken 
the bottom itself. These remarks undoubt­
edly refer to the political bottom of the 
barrel rather than the economic bottom. 
Fortunately, the political bottom, or the 
political ceiling, to use another figure, 
changes location from time to time. If the 
past is repeated in the future, when the 
public sees the need it will support sub­
stantial further tax increases.
Several arguments against higher taxa­
tion have common currency. One argu­
ment is that taxes should not be increased 
until unnecessary governmental spending 
has been eliminated. Reducing govern­
mental expenditures would of course help 
to ease both the production and the sta­
bilization problems. The reductions that 
already have been made in nondefense ex­
penditures are substantial, especially if 
increasing costs are taken into account.
It is fully within the power of Congress 
to reduce expenditures still more if it 
chooses to do so. The rub comes in defin­
ing “unnecessary.” Substantial reduction 
in governmental spending can be achieved 
only through reducing the programs of 
services rendered. Critics who put their 
emphasis on cutting personnel are attack­
ing not the roots of the problem but only 
the leaves. Personnel cannot be greatly 
reduced if the programs are to be car­
ried into effect, and even large personnel 
cuts would affect only a small part of total 
governmental expenditures. Virtually every 
Federal spending program has the strong 
organized support of groups of citizens 
who consider that program to be essential. 
To be sure, each group sees other pro­
grams that it thinks should be reduced, 
but these also have their defenders. When 
the smoke clears away the amount of “un­
necessary” expenditures lopped off is likely 
to be disappointingly small.
It is not safe either to count on or to 
wait for expenditure cuts to solve any 
part of the stabilization problem. If after 
adequate tax increases are provided, sub­
stantial expenditure reductions are actu­
ally realized and result in a budget sur­
plus, which is a most unlikely result, that 
surplus will be highly desirable. Any tax 
reductions that proved to be possible at 
that time surely would not be resented by 
taxpayers.
Another argument against higher taxes 
is that they will damage the economy. 
Some of the same persons said the same 
thing in 1929 and in 1939 and no doubt 
in other years before, between, and after 
these. Since those dates, taxes have greatly 
increased. The economy has also grown 
to such an extent that most persons have 
much more real income after taxes now 
than they did then. Capital investment, 
business profits after taxes, and the level 
of living have all risen in real terms, after 
adjusting for price changes. These facts 
do not of course prove the falsity of claims 
that further tax increases would damage 
the economy, but they cast a good deal of 
doubt on the reliability of such claims.
The relation of taxes to the economic 
burden of the defense program is often 
misunderstood. That economic burden con­
sists of the goods that we must do with­
out because resources must be used for 
defense production rather than to produce 
civilian supplies. Holding taxes down dur­
ing the mobilization period will not make 
any larger the supplies of goods and serv­
ices which the public as a whole can 
purchase, and increasing taxes, if care­
fully done, will not reduce the supplies. 
Tax increases do not increase the eco­
nomic burden of the defense program; 
they distribute it much more fairly than 
does inflation. There seems to be no ques­
tion that the economic burden of the pres­
ent program can be borne, which is at 
least prima facie evidence that the tax 
burden to pay for it also can be borne.
A tax increase might be said to have 
exceeded the economic limit if it had no 
anti-inflationary effects. There is a sim­
ple misunderstanding on this point that 
ought to be cleared up. It is often said 
that tax increases will not be anti-infla­
tionary because the money will be spent 
by government. The only case in which the 
argument is valid is one in which the 
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money would not be spent by the govern­
ment unless the tax was levied. During 
the mobilization period, however, expendi­
tures will likely be made in the amounts 
that are deemed necessary for national 
security, with little if any regard for the 
volume of taxes. Effects of expenditures 
and effects of taxes are thus separate and 
independent. The increasing of taxes would 
thus reduce inflationary pressures by de­
creasing spendable funds in the hands of 
the public.
For a tax increase not to be anti-infla­
tionary, one of three results would have 
to follow its imposition. The tax rates 
might be so high that incentives to work 
and produce would be seriously reduced, 
resulting in the supply of goods being 
reduced as much as or more than the de­
mand was reduced by the increased tax. 
Or, the tax increase might put taxes so 
high that the taxpayers would be outraged 
and would literally force an increase in 
their compensation regardless of controls 
imposed to prevent it. Since controls and 
taxes alike must fail unless there is gen­
eral acceptance and cooperation by the 
public, the whole stabilization program 
might be threatened. Or, the tax increases 
might so stimulate efforts to evade and 
avoid payment that the collections would 
not increase.
The political ceiling to taxation is likely 
to be so far below the economic ceiling 
that we scarcely need worry about raising 
the general level of taxes too high for the 
economy to carry. Tax increases of course 
should not be permitted to be offset by 
compensatory price or income increases 
of the persons or businesses on which the 
tax burden was intended to fall. More­
over, we should be on the lookout for 
signs that specific tax rates are being put 
too high, since this might happen when 
the general level of taxes was still well 
below the economic limit.
An important obstacle to adequate taxa­
tion is that each of various economic 
groups believes that the tax burdens can 
and should be pushed off on to other 
groups. The resulting struggle takes the 
form of resistance to specific tax increases, 
and this in the aggregate is resistance to 
tax increases generally.
It is unfortunate that the fight against 
inflation is weakened by the seeming un­
willingness of Congress, after its splen­
did start in 1950, to provide adequate tax 
revenues in 1951. The result is to make 
more difficult the task of other stabiliza­
tion programs. These programs must bear 
a greater load and have less chance of 
success when taxation is not adequate to 
the need.
A second program for stabilization is 
the increase of personal and business sav­
ings. Saving is the nonspending of income; 
and nonspending does not create infla­
tionary pressures. To be effective against 
inflation, savings must not be used to pur­
chase such investments as housing, or in­
ventories, or new capital equipment. Such 
uses of saving increase demand just as 
spending on consumer goods. To be most 
effective against inflation, the savings 
should either be held in cash or used to 
buy Government securities. If other kinds 
of securities are purchased or if debts are 
repaid, the persons to whom the money 
is paid must, in turn, either hold the funds 
in cash or purchase government securi­
ties, if the anti-inflationary effect of sav­
ing is to be achieved. Money held in cash 
has the disadvantage that it seems to burn 
holes in some people’s pockets, so that 
the saving may not be as permanent as 
if the savings are held in some other form. 
Buying government securities is a par­
ticularly good way of holding savings be­
cause the government can use the funds 
to keep down its debts to banks, thereby 
restricting the volume of money. The Sav­
ings Bond campaign now under way 
should be vigorously supported. Every ef­
fort should be made to expand the amount 
of savings done by the public in this 
period of mobilization.
Several factors enter into the size of 
personal savings. If you do not expect 
prices will rise, you are likely to postpone 
more spending and thus save more than 
if you expect prices will rise. If you ex­
pect goods will become scarce in the fu­
ture, you will likely save less now than if 
you expect a plentiful supply. Accord­
ingly, the degree of inflationary pressure 
that is expected is in itself a force affect­
ing the rate of saving, which in turn 
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affects inflationary pressure. Shortages of 
such goods as durable consumers’ goods, 
such as automobiles, washing machines, 
refrigerators, and the like, if combined 
with vigorous price control measures, may 
in the months ahead create substantial 
amounts of personal savings, since many 
people would rather save their money to 
be able to buy these goods in the future 
than to use their whole incomes in buying 
other kinds of goods.
Although very helpful, savings are not 
as good an anti-inflationary measure as 
are taxes, because adding to government 
debt increases the cost of debt service and 
may lead to future inflationary dangers.
Borrowing money to use in buying goods 
is the reverse of saving; it has the effects 
of negative saving. Therefore, to main­
tain the maximum amount of net personal 
and business saving, it is necessary to hold 
down borrowing. The restriction of bor­
rowing is the purpose of several of the 
government’s anti-inflationary programs. 
Selective credit controls are used to cut 
down the amount of borrowing to buy 
durable consumers’ goods and new houses. 
Recently the Congress has seen fit to 
weaken the application of these restraints. 
A voluntary program of credit control and 
certain other measures have been em­
ployed to restrain the general expansion 
of credit.
Still another program for stabilization 
is that of direct controls of commodity 
prices, wages, rents, etc. One of two mis­
takes is commonly made in considering 
price and wage controls.
On the one hand, it is a mistake to ex­
pect too much from them. Some people 
have assumed that the whole job of sta­
bilization can be done simply by fixing 
prices and wages. This view leaves out of 
account the effects of the mobilization 
program on the demand for and supply 
of goods. Without being firmly backed up 
by tax, credit, and savings programs, price 
controls will lead, if effective, to empty 
shelves and, if ineffective, to black mar­
kets. Other stabilization programs to re­
duce demand are important to make price 
controls effective. Price controls need to 
be effective if wage controls are to be 
effective since otherwise the major burden 
of mobilization would be concentrated on 
the wage-earning groups.
On the other hand, it is a mistake to 
say that price and wage controls can do 
no good at all, or that they necessarily do 
more harm than good. Price and wage 
controls can, in fact, make a major con­
tribution to stabilization by restricting the 
increase of incomes, and, by the same 
token, restricting increases of costs. The 
inflationary spiral is produced by two 
forces: increased spending power, which 
pushes prices up by raising demand, and 
increased costs, which make it necessary 
for sellers to raise their prices. An in­
crease in one price leads to other price 
rises throughout the economy, and prices 
and wages are similarly interlocked. Price 
controls and wage controls help to hold 
down both incomes and costs, and thus 
help to cut off the inflationary spiral.
Thus far I have described how the eco­
nomic problems of mobilization are being 
met through a comprehensive set of pro­
grams directed toward achieving produc­
tion goals and maintaining a stable econ­
omy. Many of these programs, such as 
the procurement, taxation, credit, and sav­
ings programs, are entirely consistent with 
the economic freedoms of more normal 
times—freedoms which are a keystone of 
our national policy and a foundation for 
our national prosperity. Other programs 
such as materials controls, price controls, 
and wage controls, inevitably impair eco­
nomic freedom and would not be used if 
the situation did not require it. If con­
tinued over a long period, such controls 
could have serious effects on the economy. 
But not using them during the intense 
period of defense mobilization would 
cause even more damage.
The success of the production programs 
seems to be assured in the sense that the 
economy clearly can and will produce what 
is required under the present defense pro­
gram. The success of the production pro­
grams will always be relative, however, 
since it is not likely that we shall pro­
duce enough or produce it soon enough 
to meet desirable goals.
The realization of the defense produc­
tion programs will inevitably be at the 
expense of other important segments of 
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the economy. The production of consum­
ers’ durable goods is being cut back. Struc­
tural steel is in short supply, with the re­
sult that commercial and other construc­
tion are being sharply restricted. There 
are other crucial shortages. Many state 
and local improvement projects will prob­
ably have to be postponed. The allocation 
of scarce materials and other scarce re­
sources certainly will never be solved to 
the general satisfaction of the public.
Many projects of seemingly high prior­
ity will have to be set aside until later. 
It is simply impossible to take care of 
them all. The problem is to see that the 
cutbacks are intelligently made with a 
broad view of the national interest in the 
present emergency.
How successful the stabilization pro­
gram will be depends on many factors, 
some economic, some political. The re­
laxation of inflationary pressures and the 
resulting downward drift of many prices 
over the past few months is very encourag­
ing. But the growing defense expenditure 
will be a powerful influence toward pro­
ducing a new period of strong inflationary 
pressure. There is no basic reason, how­
ever, why the anti-inflation programs can­
not be put in position to meet the pressure 
successfully, if and when it comes.
Success in these programs, however, re­
quires understanding support throughout 
the country. In many respects this support 
has been gratifying. Unfortunately, how­
ever, thus far there is not much evidence 
that the major economic groups are pre­
pared to accept the sacrifices which suc­
cessful stabilization requires — sacrifices 
to be made with or without stabilization.
Stabilization means giving up increases 
in income which we might otherwise re­
ceive. It is not difficult to find people who 
say they will give up increases in income 
if they can be assured that their costs will 
not go up, but usually they insist that all 
cost increases falling upon them must be 
allowed to be promptly reflected in higher 
incomes to them. That is the doctrine of 
escalation, which prevails in agricultural 
prices that are not above parity, in indus­
trial and mercantile prices under the re­
cent revision of the Defense Production 
Act, and in wage stabilization policy. In­
sistence on escalation is a very understand­
able point of view. But if, when controls 
are first imposed, there is a lack of equili­
brium among various prices and costs, 
and if taxes, savings, and credit controls 
are not sufficient to hold down demand, 
how can we expect that prices and wages 
will be fully stabilized under the escala­
tion principle? Delays in applying esca­
lation would be very helpful in holding 
increases to a slow rate, as would other 
methods of absorbing part of the cost in­
creases instead of passing them all along 
in price and wage increases.
The task of stabilization may be greatly 
eased if the consuming public voluntarily 
decides to save a larger per cent of its in­
come than has been in the case in the past, 
and if business reduces its plans for the 
expansion of plant and equipment of the 
less necessary types. However, it is not 
safe to assume that relief will come from 
these sources. The experience of the past 
15 months indicates how easily a mass 
movement can develop in an inflationary 
direction. This is the time to keep our 
stabilization machinery in absolutely first- 
class running order with all the necessary 
powers intact.
We need not look forward to an indefi­
nite continuation of control programs. 
They are most necessary during the pe­
riod when the direction of production 
must be changed and before the normal 
growth of production has caught up with 
the additional strain placed upon the 
economy by the defense program. With a 
defense program of the size planned, the 
economy should gradually become ad­
justed to the new situation, assuming that 
adequate taxes and other general restraints 
on demand are imposed. Then the direct 
controls could be reduced or eliminated. 
But that is a matter for the future. The 
problem now is how to make the controls 
more effective, not how to relax them.
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Freedom and Finance
Harold E. Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania
IN SPEAKING OF FREEDOM AND FINANCE, I should like first to place them in a some­what broad context. At this moment there 
is very vivid in my mind an occurrence 
that happened two month ago in Berlin 
when I visited that war-shattered center 
of the cold war. It was the day on which 
was conducted the parade of one million 
boys and girls all living under Communist 
rule. That day I personally observed thou­
sands of these youths slip across the line 
and come over to the American, to the free 
section of Berlin. I observed their search 
for information. I observed the eager man­
ner in which they said, “We are told this 
and we are told that. Now what is the 
real truth about it?”
I observed a good many hundreds of 
them as they gathered in the radio station 
studio of RIAS, or “Radio Free Berlin,” 
and how there the German commentators 
and radio announcers of the free Berlin 
station would answer their questions and 
give them the information they sought, and 
how these youths from communist-control- 
led Eastern Germany would raise these 
many questions about what they were be­
ing told, and about what was happening in 
the rest of the world, and even about what 
was happening to them inside the Iron 
Curtain.
In the midst of one of these sessions, a 
young lad from Saxony arose, and as he 
made certain points and asked certain 
questions, suddenly he said in his own 
tongue, “Freedom is so precious. Freedom 
is so precious.”
I can report to you from around the 
world that there is a rising awareness by 
people everywhere that freedom is pre­
cious, that it means so much in the happi­
ness and the enjoyment and the fruitful­
ness of life.
But one of the things I am most con­
cerned about is that there is not as keen 
an awareness and understanding of the 
essential requirements for freedom. Free­
dom is precious. People are becoming 
aware of it; aware of it from the reports 
of those who slip out from under the Iron 
Curtain; aware of it from the reports of 
people who dash across the line, like the 
recent dramatic escape of the Czechoslo­
vakian engineer who drove his train right 
past the Communist border guards and 
made it to freedom in the American zone 
of Germany. They know that freedom is 
precious from reports like that of the 
Polish sailors who recently mutinied in 
the Baltic Sea and got to Sweden and to 
freedom. They know it from their observa­
tions of the whole wide range of semi­
regimented or nationally controlled states 
on up to the reports that now come with 
increasing frequency and corroboration 
from the Soviet territory itself.
But frankly my great concern is that 
people today do not recognize clearly the 
essential requirements of freedom, of a 
freedom that will endure, a freedom that 
children can enjoy and carry on, and pass 
on to their children. That is the kind of 
freedom that I would discuss—especially 
since I know full well the importance of 
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your leadership in business and the world 
of active affairs here in our America, which 
is now the leading nation of the world, 
populated by only one-sixteenth of the 
world’s people, but producing one-third of 
all the world’s goods and services.
The important point to remember with 
respect to freedom is that freedom cannot 
long be maintained unless it is true and 
complete freedom. By that I mean economic 
freedom as well as social and political and 
religious freedom—freedom to buy and to 
sell, freedom to produce and to manufac­
ture, freedom to invest and to save, free­
dom to work and to earn.
The economic freedoms, as has been 
proved over and over again in the whole 
sweep of history, are inseparable and indi­
visible from any lasting, true freedom for 
a people.
I speak of these things now very positive­
ly, but not with any partisan spirit or 
purpose. Rather my concern and my re­
marks today are beyond party considera­
tions, because actually in these funda­
mental things, the country’s direction, the 
country’s long-term actions cannot be de­
cided by any one political party. Only if 
the whole of the people understand the 
essentials and hold firm to them, and in 
so doing cause them to be embodied in the 
policies of both parties, only under those 
circumstances can the basic essentials of 
freedom and democracy be maintained and 
kept alive and vital through, not just years, 
but through decades and generations.
If you pause to reflect on the early 
history of our country and the great prin­
ciples of freedom which the Founding 
Fathers set forth, you will know that those 
principles have been maintained and have 
been held through a century and a half or 
more because they became the very fabric 
of America and thus were translated into 
the platforms and policies of all the lead­
ing political parties.
So it is with this sense of our nation’s 
history that I now speak about the basic 
fact of economic freedom—that it is indi­
visible from a total, true, and lasting 
freedom in America. It is with this sense 
that I speak specifically and directly to 
you about freedom and finance.
It is my conviction that we have been 
evolving in America what I would describe 
as a modern, dynamic, people’s capitalism, 
and that this people’s capitalism is some­
thing very different from a nationalized 
economy or socialized state, and also very 
different from the laissez-faire capitalism 
of a time gone by. This modern people’s 
capitalism is a dynamic economy. It 
evolves. And it does so because it recog­
nizes the strength and the rights of labor, 
and the need for the breaking up of 
monopolies and for a wide diffusion of 
shareholding in capital structure. These 
and many other distinctions characterize 
the American business and financial scene 
and make it different from the early sys­
tems of capitalism abroad. These distinc­
tive characteristics point to the contin­
uation of a favorable evolvement of a 
modern, dynamic, people’s capitalism here 
in America. Nevertheless, our progress can 
be halted. We can slip all to easily into 
the tragic economic mistakes that have 
wrecked other systems.
Two of these dangers and the means of 
avoiding them are of very special and 
direct concern to you. They are matters in 
which your counsel, your advice, your 
participation, and your efforts at shaping 
public opinion are of very great moment. 
Others I shall touch upon are also of con­
cern to you, but they are more directly the 
concern of other groups in the national 
life of our America. In any case, none are 
more important to any of us than the two 
that I lay before you—the avoidance of in­
flation and the maintenance of adequate 
private reserves of capital for American 
enterprise. The successful solution of these 
two problems is essential for the continu­
ance of true freedom in our nation and for 
the favorable evolvement of our economic 
system.
As to the first problem, it is tremendous­
ly important for the long-term economic 
freedom of a people that its currency, its 
money, its media of exchange, shall re­
main sound and shall inspire confidence, 
that its value shall not be dissipated by a 
continuous inflationary development. If any 
economic system reaches a point at which 
the people do not have confidence that the 
insurance policies they have taken out will 
at a future time buy their families an 
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amount of goods and services that bears a 
reasonable relationship to what currently 
can be obtained for the funds invested in 
those policies, interest in that form of sav­
ing will disappear and the life and 
strength of the economic system will be 
seriously undermined.
If the people lose interest in savings, 
which become a part of the capital forma­
tion of a country, if they lose confidence in 
the future value of the dollar units of their 
savings, if they are fearful of the future 
purchasing power of their savings, then 
you have begun to undermine very seri­
ously the economy of your country and, 
indeed, have weakened the entire social 
fabric.
And that is why I say to you that this 
whole problem of inflation, the whole prob­
lem of analyzing it, or, to be more specific, 
of meeting defense needs and other related 
needs and yet of keeping the country on a 
sound financial basis, is at the very fore­
front of the problem of insuring lasting 
freedom for our people.
When is the point reached at which you 
have too greatly dissipated the value of the 
dollar, have too greatly depreciated the 
currency? When is the point reached at 
which you have carried inflation too far?
I do not believe any economist or finan­
cier can put his finger on such a point. 
Too many factors are involved—the psy­
chology of the people, the relationship of 
currency to productivity, and many others 
equally complex. The tragic experiences 
of other countries that have gone over the 
brink and have seen their currency go to 
pieces do not provide any exact rules for 
determining the danger point in advance. 
In inflation you do not know you have gone 
too far until too late. You discover where 
you are after you have slid over the edge.
Now economists may argue about when 
you have gone too far in inflation, but all 
experience says that when you get too close 
to the edge, people suddenly shift their 
psychology, and then it is too late. That 
is why one of the grave concerns of this 
country, with its world-wide responsibili­
ties, with its vast and varied defense needs, 
beset by all the difficulties caused by 
wrong policies in the post war years and 
burdened down by a vast debt must be 
alert against inflation. For the sake of the 
dollar? Oh, no! For the sake of people 
in business? Oh, no! For the sake of 
financiers? Oh, no! Rather for the sake 
of the freedom of the people of this 
country and for their enjoyment of life 
and their children’s enjoyment of life! 
We must be alert to the importance of the 
stability and soundness of the American 
currency as a foundation stone of freedom 
and democracy.
The second main point in this matter of 
maintaining lasting freedom that I particu­
larly want to discuss is: If there is to be 
vitality and productivity in the long-term 
economic development of a country, then 
it is of tremendous importance that we 
have in that country substantial pools of 
investment capital in private hands with 
the right of private citizens to invest it as 
they see fit without permission of anyone 
from government.
Here again many tragic experiences 
throughout the world reveal what happens 
to an economy when the only way a busi­
ness can really develop and expand and 
realize its potentialities is through the 
kind permission of men in government. 
This again is a question that goes beyond 
any political party; it goes to the funda­
mentals of government.
You can study the record in the Europ­
ean countries, you can study the record in 
the Asiatic countries; and when you see in 
private hands substantial pools of capital, 
whether they be controlled by individuals 
or by groups of individuals organized 
through some form of association or by 
pooling through banks, or however the 
control is exerted; when you see in pri­
vate hands pools of capital, and risks be­
ing taken, and money being invested with­
out permission being asked of anyone in 
government; then you see an economy 
developing, you see productivity expanding 
because of self-generating initiative. On 
the other hand, when you see men in 
government, regardless of how well-inten­
tioned they are in the beginning, exercis­
ing control in one way or another over all 
the major sources of capital, then you see 
an economy beginning to wither, produc­
tivity beginning to decrease; and with 
these beginnings come the multiplication 
24 Financial Information Needed in Today’s Mobilization Economy
and the acceleration of the inflationary 
pressures of a country.
These then are the two specific things 
that I lay before you for your considera­
tion and attention in your own individual 
activities. I realize fully well that in a free 
society policies of this kind are actually 
decided, not by political parties, not by 
public officeholders, but rather by the peo­
ple. The people make their decisions in 
that intangible but definite way in which 
public opinion takes form. The decisions 
are made when the great body of the 
public is influenced by the intelligent 
leadership that shows itself in discussions 
by those who are best informed. You, I 
must point out, are a segment of the best 
informed public. And therefore when finan­
cial subjects are being considered, your 
counsel and your informal discussions at 
luncheons, dinners, bridge parties, golf 
games, or wherever you may be, play a 
part in developing the public opinion of 
America on the essentials of financial 
policy, and by contributing to that develop­
ment you are affecting the future deci­
sions of both political parties and of 
America.
Now, I will just briefly touch upon other 
things that, in this economic field, are so 
essential for freedom. As you observe what 
happens around the world, the firm con­
viction comes to you that it is tremendous­
ly important that the farms of a nation be 
owned and controlled by the men who till 
the soil and not by the men of the govern­
ment. And it is tremendously important too, 
that the professions of a country, particu­
larly the medical profession, be independ­
ent professions and not strait-jacketed 
bureaucracies under a socialistic scheme of 
nationalized medicine or socialized medi­
cine or any other kind of nationaliza­
tion of the professions of a country.
Similarly it is tremendously important 
that the schools of a country be under 
local control and not under a central, 
nationalized control, whatever the form of 
government.
It is also important that the great basic 
industries—steel and chemicals, oil and 
utilities—should be in private hands and 
not in the hands of the men who run the 
government. In some of the countries of 
the world, here is one of the first places 
the nation is lured into socialism, because 
nothing is easier than for the demagogue 
to point to some huge industry, something 
remote and not understood by the people, 
and say, “We just want to take this over 
for the benefit of the people.” Once it is 
taken over, the additional power that that 
act places in the hand of men in govern­
ment leads to other powers being sought 
by those men in government. Even though 
those who first take over an industry may 
be sincere, history shows that those who 
subsequently come into government and 
control the industries use that power to 
take more economic power from the 
people. And once the balance shifts so 
that the major power of the people in 
economic matters has been shifted to the 
men in your government, then other free­
doms are soon lost.
Let me also call your attention to one 
more example of the way in which the 
first step to the loss of economic freedom 
has been taken in some countries. Or 
rather, let me state it this way: that for 
the maintenance of lasting freedom it is 
tremendously important that the retail 
stores of the country be owned and operat­
ed directly by the people as private citi­
zens and not by men in government.
And finally, of course, and most import­
ant but inseparable from the rest, there 
are the traditional rights of freedom of 
speech and of the press, freedom of voting, 
and freedom of religion. These freedoms 
must be maintained. Freedom is precious, 
freedom is indivisible; and I trust we 
never forget that if men become dependent 
on decisions by other men in government, 
as to what they may eat and what they 
may wear, as to where they may work 
and what they may earn, as to what they 
may build and what they may fabricate, 
as to how they may invest and how they 
may profit; if that day comes, then this 
precious freedom is soon lost, or is al­
ready lost.
In spite of present world trends and the 
problems of economic systems affecting 
freedom, I say to you that I appear before 
you today with optimism and I am still 
confident in the future of our America, a 
nation of people who have true freedom.
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Charles E. Wilson, Director, Defense Mobilization
The brains and the skill of certified public accountants touch the defense mobilization effort at many points, just as 
they did in the days of World War IL 
As a member of the War Production 
Board, I know how the Institute and its 
members helped procurement agencies on 
contract negotiation, cost definition, rene­
gotiation, and termination. You also helped 
prepare accounting manuals for the Armed 
Forces and government agencies. You 
helped Selective Service and the War 
Manpower Commission in the allocation 
of accounting personnel. You aided the 
Office of Price Administration to formu­
late its financial reporting procedure.
In the simpler days of our nation, ’way 
back in the eighteenth century, a man 
could count on his fingers, or use an 
abacus. But now we deal in figures that 
are borrowed from astronomy. You ac­
countants are needed to see that astron­
omy does not degenerate into astrology.
In the course of many years, as an offi­
cer of that little company I was connected 
with, I became accustomed to thinking in 
terms of millions of dollars. But now I 
must think in terms of billions. I haven’t 
been able to become used to it. I find 
myself saying “millions” when I mean 
“billions.” I haven’t been in Washington 
long enough to get used to billions—let’s 
hope I won’t be there that long. It’s really 
hard to understand what one billion dol­
lars means. Do you know that spending 
one billion dollars means spending one 
dollar every minute since the birth of 
Christ, minus 49 years?
In round numbers, the cost of defense 
mobilization will be fifty billions a year 
for three years, or one hundred and fifty 
billion dollars. It is difficult to visualize 
just how much that is. Our national debt 
is approximately 250 billion dollars. To 
put that in another way, it is one-fourth 
of a trillion. Most of us still shy away 
from that word “trillion.” Yet, to use a 
more comforting figure, the total value of 
goods and services produced in the United 
States last year exceeded 300 billion dol­
lars. It was close to one-third of a trillion. 
Along with these Buck Rogers figures 
come complicated laws and regulations 
which need trained interpretation and cal­
culation. In the last ten years, the number 
of CPAs has almost doubled, but the de­
mand for them is still growing.
Defense Mobilization has produced 
many new accounting problems, and I 
know you would like to have me tell you 
how best to cope with the orders of the 
Office of Price Stabilization and the 
rules of the National Production Author­
ity. You would like to know the most 
efficient way of applying for a certificate 
of necessity for rapid tax amortization. You 
would be glad to have a thorough ex­
planation of the procedure in wage and 
salary stabilization. You would like to 
know if all your bright young men are 
going to be taken by Selective Service, or 
whether deferments will be granted. You 
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would appreciate information on how to 
advise your clients to cooperate in the 
defense effort.
I feel, however, that you are even more 
interested in getting from me an over-all 
look at defense mobilization—where we 
stand and where we’re going. We are liv­
ing in an age when anything can happen 
—and usually does. We are fighting a 
good-size war against communism in 
Korea—yet it is only one of many places 
in the world where trouble already exists 
or is threatened. The French are fighting 
Communists in Indo-China, the British in 
Malaya. In addition to open warfare, the 
free countries are being attacked by in­
filtration, subversion, espionage, and de­
ceptive propaganda.
All of this fits into a pattern of world 
conquest as dreamed up in the Kremlin, 
because, as Stalin has said, quoting Lenin, 
our kind of civilization cannot live side 
by side with the Soviet Union. We have 
tried to deal with the Communists in 
numerous ways, but without success. They 
have broken promises, flouted treaties, and 
scorned civilized usages. The Communists 
helped organize the United Nations at 
San Francisco in 1945, but ever since then 
their actions have been calculated to 
harass and defeat the UN’s efforts to bring 
about harmony among nations.
A classic example of the difficulties of 
dealing with Communists is the exasperat­
ing course of the truce talks at Kaesong. 
They began early in July, nearly three 
long months ago, and there is still no sign 
of settlement. Armistice talks in World 
War I consumed only five days. Two days’ 
negotiation were enough to bring about 
cease-fire order in Europe in World War 
II. Four days’ talk brought about the end 
of shooting in the Pacific. But after nearly 
ninety days of palaver, the Korean war 
still goes on. It has long been obvious 
that the only diplomacy that impresses the 
Communists is the diplomacy of strength. 
If the United Nations had not used its 
strength in Korea, that unhappy penin­
sula long ago would have been taken over 
by the Reds, and their huge armies would 
have been released for use elsewhere.
We are now building America’s indus­
trial power to equip a mighty Army, 
Navy, and Air Force, and to assist our 
allies in the free world to strengthen their 
defenses. We are also creating production 
lines and standby facilities that can be 
brought quickly into action in any emer­
gency. At the end of this three-year pe­
riod, we should be strong enough not only 
to meet any challenge, but to discourage 
any challenge from being made. For the 
supreme objective of defense mobilization 
is not to fight a war, but to prevent one. 
As I have often said, the nation is taking 
out an insurance policy against World 
War III.
There are those who fear that the result 
of an armament race is likely to be war, 
rather than otherwise. But if we look back 
at history, we find that war has often 
been the result of unpreparedness. In 1939, 
neither England nor France was prepared 
for the war that Hitler started, and it may 
well be doubted that Hitler would have 
dared to precipitate World War II if they 
had been well-armed.
In any event, what alternative do we 
have except to build America’s might? A 
fat, lazy, and militarily weak Uncle Sam 
would be duck soup for Soviet Russia. 
As General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief 
of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, said in a 
recent address: “Among nations as among 
men, the best protection against a criminal 
is the power and the determination to 
strike back swiftly and decisively. Today 
the people of the United States have the 
determination and they are building the 
power.”
Defense mobilization is now moving into 
high gear. The first half of 1951 was de­
voted largely to contract-signing, the draw­
ing of specifications and blueprints, the 
tooling-up of industries, and the other 
birth pains that are the necessary pre­
liminary to mass production. In the three 
months from July through September, de­
liveries of military goods totaled more 
than five billions. This was four times the 
rate just before Korea.
This is a stream that will soon become 
a torrent. We are getting heavy and me­
dium bombers, light and medium tanks, 
guns of all kinds, electronic fire control 
systems, various types of rockets, while 
the Navy has completed modernization of 
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a number of warships. The delivery rate 
from here forward is plotted on a con­
stantly ascending curve. It will reach a 
peak of $4 billions a month in the first 
half of 1953.
You saw production miracles during 
World War II. You are about to witness 
them again. You will see not only volume 
production in the best American tradition, 
but you will also see the result of superior 
methods and new technological processes 
developed since the last war ended. The 
new weapons will have refinements in op­
eration in the interest of speed and accu­
racy, as well as unbelievable punishing 
power.
Of course, we are having some tempo­
rary disappointments and difficulties. Of 
course, we are having to smash bottle­
necks and to cope with scarcities. You 
know how we had to move in various ways 
to overcome the shortages of machine 
tools, which lie at the very heart of any 
mass production effort. The machine tool 
industry fell into the doldrums at the end 
of the war. It needed price incentives, 
super-priorities for raw materials, and new 
manpower. It is getting these things, so 
that it may attack its backlog of orders 
with vigor and confidence.
The scarcity of raw materials, particu­
larly metals, is a continuing problem. This 
was foreseen and long ago we took steps 
to increase the supply of steel and alu­
minum. Part of our scarcity problem arises 
from the expansion of these industries. It 
takes steel to build new steel and alumi­
num plants. But this is bread cast upon 
the waters, and it has already begun to 
return to us in the form of increased pro­
duction.
Copper presents a special problem. Our 
entire domestic supply, plus what we are 
able to buy from Chile, is not sufficient 
to meet our needs. We are seeking new 
copper development in Nevada, Arizona, 
South America, and Alaska, but it will be 
a long time before the metal from these 
sources will begin to flow to industry. In 
the case of rubber, imports of natural 
rubber are being largely augmented by 
our synthetic plants. Oil drilling and re­
fining goes on at an accelerated pace, and 
large increases are being made in power 
production. Thus, to meet the demands of 
defense mobilization, we are increasing 
our entire productive base. This is just 
another example of the dynamic quality 
of the American system, and of its abil­
ity to spurt ahead under pressure.
Not many years ago, there were those 
who contended that our economy had al­
ready reached a condition of maturity. 
That implied that arterio-sclerosis was 
about to set in. How false that diagnosis 
was is shown by the record of the last 
decade. First, we accomplished the stu­
pendous task of production for World 
War II, providing for our huge forces 
both in Europe and in the Pacific, besides 
sending billons of dollars of goods to our 
Allies under lend-lease. Next, we con­
founded the so-called experts who pre­
dicted a recession after the war. Instead 
of the long line of unemployed that was 
forecast, industry and commerce moved 
smoothly from war to peace production 
and, instead of post-war depression, we 
had a post-war boom. The year 1950 was 
a record-breaker for civilian production.
Now we are rearming on a gigantic 
scale, and we are able to do so while 
maintaining civilian production at high 
levels. When all of the new expansion 
plans have been completed and are in 
place, we shall be ready to write a new 
and glowing chapter in the history of the 
Industrial Revolution. Barring another 
world war, the future of America can be 
splendid and magnificent. Our people can 
enjoy even higher standards of living and 
the fruits of our industrial progress can 
spread throughout the world.
But at this point I must warn that, if 
we are to enjoy material benefits, they 
must be accompanied by spiritual values 
and by rugged qualities of character. We 
cannot accomplish the objectives of de­
fense mobilization without sacrifices and 
restraints. As military production bites 
deeper into our capacity, there will be 
temporary shortages of civilian goods. 
Higher taxes will have to be paid. Regu­
lations regarding prices and wages will 
have to be observed. Individuals will have 
to make decisions of many kinds con­
cerning their own actions, and the ques­
tion they should have constantly in mind 
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is: “Will it help or harm the nation’s ef­
fort?”
The defense mobilization program could 
be wrecked by runaway inflation, and 
whether or not we have runaway inflation 
depends to a large extent on the policies 
of the large pressure groups—industry, 
labor, agriculture. Will they use restraint 
or will they jockey for individual advan­
tage? Will they accept reasonable prices 
and wages, or will they seek to upset the 
balances that the government is trying 
to achieve in the interest of stabilization?
We are now enjoying a period of rel­
ative calm on the price-wage front. The 
freeze order of last January has had the 
most salutary results. In the last seven 
months the consumers’ price index rose 
less than 1 per cent. Of course, other 
factors besides the freeze order have con­
tributed to this result, such as the piling 
up of huge inventories and the fact that 
people are saving instead of spending. But 
the January freeze, however imperfect it 
was, had a tremendous psychological ef­
fect. When people believe that prices will 
rise, they will buy even if they don’t need 
the goods. If they see prices steady they 
are more willing to buy only what they 
need.
Whereas there were no real shortages 
when the 1950-1951 panic buying oc­
curred, we are now entering a period when 
inflation pressures will be real rather than 
psychological. There will be fewer things 
to buy and more purchasing power in 
the hands of the people. Then will come 
the real test of the numerous safeguards 
that have been erected against inflation.
I am happy to say that Congress is 
now reconsidering some of the weakening 
amendments that were added to the De­
fense Production Act when it was passed 
last July. One of these amendments tends 
to upset the whole price structure, as 
applied to manufacturers, which the Of­
fice of Price Stabilization has worked out 
after many months of careful considera­
tion. It has been called an accountants’ 
dream. I think it should be called instead 
an accountants’ nightmare.
I have complete confidence in the na­
tion’s genius for production. If, at the 
same time, we can exercise the restraints 
and the self-discipline to keep the econ­
omy stabilized, we will have met the 
test imposed upon us in these critical 
times.
I have spoken of spiritual values and 
I don’t know how better I can explain 
what I mean than to repeat to you an elo­
quent statement I heard at New York 
University last June. The speaker was 
Acting Chancellor James L. Madden. Mr. 
Madden told the blessings that had been 
heaped upon our country and he said: 
“There must also be a revival of spiritual 
values in our daily lives, if our industrial 
mobilization is to be fully effective. As 
America has been growing over the years, 
too many of our people have drifted from 
the religious concepts of their forefathers. 
They failed to realize that no nation 
can be truly great which lacks spiritual 
strength.
“Men will die for their spiritual be­
liefs because of their implicit faith in the 
Almighty. Accordingly, now is the time 
for a revival of interest in the faiths of 
our fathers, and for greater efforts to put 
into daily practice the teachings of our 
respective faiths. America’s greatness 
traces back to God-fearing men and we, 
like our forefathers, should ask for His 
blessing and guidance in our efforts to 
safeguard our country and to build even 
more solidly for the future. Let us keep 
in mind that Benjamin Franklin once 
said: ‘God governs in the affairs of men.’ ”
So our defense mobilization is not a 
slide-rule operation or one whose begin­
ning and end is to see how many weapons 
of war can be turned out of our factories. 
It is an exercise of faith—faith in the 
right of man to enjoy the precious qual­
ities of freedom and justice. We can no 
longer take freedom or justice for granted, 
as gifts handed to us by the blood and 
sacrifice of our forefathers. The lights of 
freedom and justice are going out all 
over the world where the shadow of Com­
munism has fallen. We are going to have 
to fight and strive to keep them alive, be­
cause without them life is not worth liv­
ing. If the nation will tackle the task of 
defense mobilization imbued with that 
great ideal, there need be no fear about 
the outcome.
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The impact of the defense program on civilian economy is unbelievably great. You just cannot go into this sort 
of defense effort without having great ef­
fect upon your work as you go among 
your clients and as you prepare the re­
ports and do the work of your office. It 
is certainly true that runaway prices mean 
runaway costs, for both the military and 
civilian activities of the government. 
Former Secretary Marshall of the De­
partment of Defense pointed out that sev­
eral billions of dollars have already been 
lost in the defense budget simply through 
price increases. Ships and planes and 
tanks and guns are lost just as effectively 
through price increases as if they were 
lost on the sea or on the field of battle. 
The Russians are counting on inflation to 
ruin and demoralize us so that their 
agents can take us over from within. In 
my opinion, America can be invincible 
if the economic and the industrial sys­
tems are maintained on a stable basis. 
In language that you and I understand, 
accountant’s language, I think we can 
put it this way: that our greatest asset 
is a stable economy.
The subject of this session is mobiliza­
tion problems. I am supposed to talk 
about problems that we have in our part 
of the mobilization effort in price stabili­
zation and in accounting for price stabili­
zation. Certainly we do have problems; 
we have many diverse and great ones. 
We have the problem of getting enough 
people in something so unpopular as 
price control, price stabilization, some­
hing so uncertain at the moment. It is 
extremely difficult to get really good ac­
countants willing to come in, to take such 
a heavy responsibility, and to take the 
pounding that they have to take as they 
try to do their work.
We have a problem in getting people 
to understand. Accounting-wise, OPS 
works with the problems not of one com­
pany, not of companies in one industry, 
but with the accounting problems of prac­
tically all companies. It is difficult for 
the accountant who comes to see us about 
his own particular client, or the busi­
nessman who comes about his own par­
ticular problem, to understand that the 
decisions we make, the policies we follow, 
and rules we make, have to be so de­
signed and so administered that they will 
serve for all companies.
I report that our greatest problem on 
these critical issues is to get a simple 
objective statement of the truth. What 
we need, and need so badly, is the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth.
The accounting operation in OPS is 
administered through an office of ac­
counting. It is one of eight components 
in the agency and it stands on equal 
footing with the other components of the 
agency. We have accountants stationed 
in each of the types of offices that the 
agency has. In the national office, at 
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the present time, we have about 150 ac­
countants. We have a budget of 300 there. 
We have 14 regional offices, 13 for the 
continental United States and 1 for the 
territories, and there are accountants sta­
tioned in each of them. We have, at the 
moment, I believe, about 85 district offices 
spread throughout the United States and 
some of the territories, and there are ac­
countants stationed at each of them. J 
will not say much about how we work 
beyond that, except to say that, in OPS 
accounting, we have to operate as an 
accounting firm. Some of your firms have 
worked with us in one way or another 
and I think you generally understand. 
We believe that there are certain prin­
ciples we must follow. In other words, 
we are not, we hope, just floundering; 
we think that there are certain principles 
that we have to follow. First of all, be­
fore we can do anything, we have to 
be sure of this independent position of 
accounting; that is the only way we be­
lieve it will work. We have to fight off 
any attempts to infringe on that inde­
pendence. We have had our difficulties 
and we shall probably continue to have 
them, but we have had great and strong 
consistent support from the Institute.
We are responsible for all accounting. 
In other words, accounting decisions that 
are made in Seattle, San Francisco, Min­
neapolis, Boston, or Washington, are made 
under the same set of rules of procedure, 
and we hope that they are consistent. 
We rely on generally accepted accounting 
principles consistently applied. Those are 
old words but they are important words. 
We do not try, and will not try, to tell 
any company how to do its accounting. 
That is not the function of OPS account­
ing. Attempts have been made to jockey 
us into that position but we have so far 
successfully resisted them.
We believe it is a basic right of the 
accountant to set forth the facts as he 
finds them, and we believe further that 
the OPS accountant has as great free­
dom to enjoy that basic right as any ac­
countant in the world today. That is a 
strong statement, but we believe it to be 
true. We believe that the freedom to en­
joy that right, to set forth the facts as 
they actually are, as he finds them, is 
just as great in OPS accounting as it 
is in your own particular firm.
We believe it is important to maintain 
sound and consistent accounting policy. 
In other words, these accounting deci­
sions cannot be made one by one. They 
all have to be made within a framework 
of accounting policy and we believe fur­
ther that if that basic policy is sound, 
and if our accounting executives make 
their decisions within the framework of 
that policy, it will not matter how many 
years later we come back to review that 
question, or to look at the problem again; 
given the same set of facts, and follow­
ing the same good accounting and good 
judgment, the answer will be the same. 
I constantly tell the members of the staff, 
“If you can operate on that basis, you 
don’t have to worry about investigations, 
you don’t have to worry trying to re­
member what you did.” It is almost iden­
tical with telling the truth. You don’t 
have to remember what you said. We 
don’t have to remember what we did. 
Given the same set of facts, we are 
reasonably sure we will come out with 
the same answer whether it is one year 
later, two, ten, or twenty years later.
Accounting is growing in importance 
in the administration of price control or 
price stabilization. Early attempts at price 
control, both in OPA and in OPS, in­
volved the freeze technique where you 
simply say that prices are frozen as of 
a certain time. You know, and I know, 
that that does not call for any account­
ing. There are no accounting problems 
in that method.
From that we get into industry sur­
veys where we go out to a hundred com­
panies, possibly—sometimes, when we 
get into retailing, we get as many as a 
thousand companies. We go out and try 
to pick up their costs, bring them to the 
particular office working on the case and 
get them out so that the price executive 
has some basis on which to take his ac­
tion. Those studies are made (I insist) 
objectively because we don’t know what 
the answer is supposed to be and we 
are not trying to develop accounting facts 
to back up or prove anything. We are 
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trying to find out what the facts are. 
We also review submitted cost compu­
tations. When your clients send in their 
figures to OPS, in all probability, some­
one in the accounting department will 
take a look at them. We handle indi­
vidual hardship cases where somebody 
cannot live under present regulations and 
he asks for relief. We do accounting for 
enforcement examinations and it is im­
portant I think, that the enforcement in­
vestigators, enforcement executives, and 
the accountants are separate and distinct. 
We also are responsible for maintaining 
agency accounting policy.
Now, as to our problems, I cannot cite 
all the problems we have, but I can cite 
a few of them for you. We might ask at 
what cost level should price control be 
administered. Should it be on the basis 
of direct material and direct labor? In 
other words, direct cost or primary cost? 
Well, we undertook to do that and we 
called some twenty-five leading comp­
trollers to Washington and, in an all-day 
discussion, we asked them if they could 
identify direct material and direct labor. 
If you read the cost accounting text 
books, of course that is the foundation 
of cost accounting. I suppose you call 
it the foundation of cost accounting. These 
twenty-five comptrollers said, “No, we 
can’t, in our companies, identify direct 
material and direct labor.” We submitted 
this proposition to them: If you were to 
throw all your costs up in the air and 
let them come down to the table, wouldn’t 
the direct costs fall in one pile and the 
indirect in the other? They thought about 
that for awhile and then they said, “No, 
this is not true. If you throw them all 
up in the air they will come down and 
it may be possible for you to separate 
them into two groups but we do not be­
lieve that our companies can separate 
direct material from indirect material or 
direct labor from indirect labor.”
As a result of that we came out with 
Regulation 22. I don’t want to cite regula­
tions here, but that one is so important 
that I shall have to mention it. It is based 
upon almost total material cost and almost 
total labor cost. In other words, it spills 
over direct cost to a point beyond and gets 
into the indirect factory expense. Do we 
stop there? Maybe not. Maybe we go to a 
factory cost. Do we stop there? Possibly 
not. We go on to the total cost. That is one 
type of problem we have.
Another type of problem is, do we work 
with the whole industry, or do we bring it 
down to one company and then do we work 
with the whole company or do we bring it 
down to one plant or one division, or do 
we bring it down to a product line such as 
refrigerators, or do we bring it down to a 
single product?
Another problem is, at what point does 
hardship develop? Many companies seem 
to feel that they get into difficulty, but 
what would the ground rules be to deter­
mine when a company actually experiences 
hardship? When the rate of profits does 
not hold up, or when profits do not hold 
up in total amount, or when there is a 
failure to make any profit at all—that is, 
to break even—or when there is a failure 
to earn factory costs, or when there is a 
failure to earn direct costs? Answers to 
these questions must be found.
We also have a problem of trying to 
convince people that we are not an agency 
designed to control profits. We go before 
the Congress, and we are attacked bitterly 
because we are attempting to control pro­
fits, or so it is said. Of course, the agency 
points out that it is trying to control 
prices. That is its purpose. But there is a 
failure to recognize that revenue, cost, pro­
fits, are all part of the over-all picture, and 
particularly when you get into an industry 
earnings standard—as we did in OPA and 
we had until a short time ago in OPS—it 
is very difficult to keep away from the 
charge of profit control. I am personally 
convinced that any attempt to control 
prices or to stabilize prices, if you will, 
may be subject to criticism, or probably 
will be subject to the criticism that it is 
trying to control profits.
OPA gradually—this is the old agency 
now, the wartime agency—gradually 
moved toward more and more reliance on 
accounting determinations. During the war 
years, you could see this thing develop. 
There was an increasing reliance upon 
accounting data. For good or for bad, 
OPS started where OPA left off. From the 
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start, heavy reliance was put upon account­
ing. Current legislation puts the test 
squarely on accounting. You have all read 
about OPS difficulties in the newspapers. 
Current legislation puts price stabilization 
squarely on the basis of a accounting. It 
has gone so far that accounting definitions 
are written into price stabilization legisla­
tion. “Upon application and a proper 
showing of his prices and costs by any 
person subject to a ceiling price, the Presi­
dent shall adjust such ceiling price in the 
manner prescribed. . . .” Does that mean 
one product? Ten products? One com­
pany, ten companies, or what does it 
mean? It goes on to say, and I am quoting, 
“ . . . the term ‘Costs’ includes material 
indirect and direct factory labor, factory, 
selling, advertising, office, and all other 
production, distribution, transportation, 
and administration costs, except such as 
the President may determine to be unrea­
sonable and excessive.” Now, as an ac­
countant, how would you like to administer 
that?
The important thing is not what that 
statement says (and we could discuss it 
and argue about it for a long time, I 
suppose) but that that statement is there. 
Does that lead to something else? To you, 
as leading practitioners, I think it is ex­
tremely important that that statement is 
there and legislates (in a sense) account­
ing. The President has requested the Con­
gress to repeal this provision of the Act. 
The case is now before the Congress for 
further consideration.
We have certain difficulties, many diffi­
culties, as we go along trying to get legisla­
tion that is workable. We have difficulty in 
understanding what this provision means. 
Our lawyers interpret it one way, and then 
they begin to see that maybe it should be 
interpreted some other way. As account­
ants, we get certain interpretations out of 
it, but the important thing is that it is not 
clear. It is difficult for us to try to operate 
on a basis of adjusting the price of each 
product, on a basis of the total costs of 
each particular product.
During OPA, where we had experience 
with 187 thousand companies—and we had 
something on their accounting records— 
we found, in 1946, that only 15 per cent of 
American companies break down total 
costs by products. We guessed, at that 
time, that probably 25 per cent of the pro­
duction of American companies could be 
covered on that basis on the theory (or 
principle) that the bigger companies have 
somewhat better cost accounting than the 
smaller ones although, I hasten to add, not 
as much better as you and I are apt to 
think. We have no reason to believe that 
those conditions have changed very much. 
The National Association of Manufacturers 
claims OPS overstates the difficulties of 
breaking down total costs by products. 
This is at variance with what we have 
found company experience to be, and at 
complete variance with what top company 
accountants tell us.
The top accountants, comptrollers, and 
financial vice-presidents, come in to talk 
this over with us and they say, “You can­
not do it that way. There are not enough 
accountants in the country to do it, and the 
results would not be very reliable.” But, 
when it is set down on paper, the paper 
statement does not say what the top ac­
counting executives have told us.
Now, there is something wrong. I don’t 
know what it is. It is almost impossible to 
get an objective statement from industrial 
accountants on the subject because of the 
difficulty of separating accounting facts 
from other facts on the possibility of get­
ting an increase in prices. I think that that 
is not a good situation for accountants. I 
think these things have an important effect 
on accounting and, in order to bring out 
that point, I want to refer, for a moment, 
to the field of economics and the profes­
sion of the economist.
With the entrance of the federal govern­
ment into economic and industrial affairs 
some fifteen years ago, economics became 
much more important and the economist 
had a much bigger job to do. There was a 
tremendous increase, both in the amount of 
the economic work to be done, and in the 
importance attached to the economic pro­
fession. At the same time there was a 
rapid increase in the number of persons 
who became expert economists. They were 
not economists before, but they saw the 
opportunity there and they suddenly be­
came experts in the field. Many of the 
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decisions which have caused us trouble 
have come from that type of person. It has 
been increasingly difficult to keep sepa­
rate economic and political considerations. 
This has led to the development of a 
situation in which an economist can no 
longer feel that he is safe from being 
branded an exponent of something or other 
as he goes about his work. In other words, 
when an economist makes a statement to­
day, he is likely to have the black mark 
of something attributed to him because he 
is accused of having some ulterior motive.
There is also an increasing difficulty in 
getting a completely objective and reliable 
statement on matters of economics in pres­
ent-day commerce. Although this situation 
may have made more jobs for economists, 
and may have directed more attention to 
them, in my opinion, it has hurt the pro­
fession of economics. You have all seen 
that develop.
Let us look at accounting. Accounting is 
rapidly increasing in importance in the af­
fairs of the federal government. The legis­
lation to which I have just referred will 
show that. There is a tremendous increase 
in the importance of accounting as a 
science, and of accountants in their profes­
sion. There is a rapid growth in the num­
ber of persons who call themselves ac­
countants. Now, just as ten or fifteen years 
ago, I see this in Washington—you prob­
ably see it in other places—you had this 
crop of expert economists jump up and 
start to make decisions, you now have 
expert accountants appearing. Within our 
agency and in other places, there is a 
great tendency for people to become 
experts in the field of accounting who 
never thought of accounting before it in­
creased in importance. There may now be 
an increasing difficulty to keep separate 
accounting and political considerations. 
Will a situation develop in which the 
accountant can no longer feel that he is 
safe from being branded as an exponent 
of something or other as he goes about his 
work? There is already some indication 
of increasing difficulty to get a completely 
objective and reliable statement on ac­
counting matters from a present-day ac­
countant. If these things come true, it will 
be a sad day for the individual accountant 
and for his professional society, the AIA.
The American Institute of Accountants 
has helped us as we have gone along. We 
have relied on many of your firms, your 
larger firms. We hired six public account­
ing firms to do accounting work for the 
Office of Price Stabilization when it looked 
as though the job was getting too big for 
us. My decision to use public accountants, 
in that sense, was reversed by my supe­
riors and we had to call them off before 
their work was done, but they did come 
in, and those firms know our problems.
You may be interested to know—I think 
this is a bad sign, but it happened—that, 
while one of the most respected firms in 
your profession was working for OPS, a 
practicing accountant from a New England 
state wrote both his State Senators and 
his Congressman that this was perfect sit­
uation for this leading public accounting 
firm to steal his clients. That came from a 
practicing accountant and the letters were 
turned over to us—to our office. It was 
shocking, but it actually happened.
The Institute has offered to help us in 
many ways. All during the war, The Journal 
of Accountancy supported objective treat­
ment of accounting data and backed us one 
hundred per cent, for which I shall always 
be grateful. The Institute subcommittee on 
price stabilization has offered its help, but 
I want to point out that we don’t need help 
so much on the individual regulations—de­
ciding what is acceptable cost and what is 
not, or how to handle this particular item 
or that one. We do need help on the 
broader issues, the broader issues that 
affect us and affect the Institute.
Just recently I arranged for five leading 
practitioners, one from each of five public 
accounting firms, to come to Washington 
to testify before the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee, on accounting truth 
or accounting fact. These men offered to 
go through considerable personal sacrifice 
to do that. When we got to that point, 
somebody had to arrange for these people 
to come. In other words, either the Com­
mittee had to ask them, or they had to ask 
to be heard. It seemed to me that the 
Institute was the logical place to have that 
request originate. My call was made 
when the Executive Committee was in ses­
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sion, and the request went before that 
committee. The decision of the American 
Institute Executive Committee was that 
this was not a matter on which accountants 
could ask to be heard.
To me, the important thing is that ac­
counting is so much the foundation of 
national affairs that someone must speak 
for it. Someone has to speak for the ac­
counting profession on these matters. I 
can go even beyond that. I can say that, at 
the present time, accounting is so import­
ant in the international affairs of this 
Government that it should be of concern 
to you, to me, and to all accountants. We 
practice what we preach on that. Some of 
the people in the audience know of a case 
where we practically forced the downfall 
of a foreign government on the right to 
audit objectively. We finally won our point, 
but it had to be carried to the point of a 
cabinet crisis and it almost forced the 
downfall of a government. We thought, 
and we still think, that the issue was 
important enough to follow it that far. We 
think, and we continue to think, that on 
these important issues in accounting, some­
body must speak for accounting. I cannot 
help but insist that the responsibility is 
here and that the opportunity is knocking 
so loudly it can be heard in many places.
I have certain suggestions, if I may offer 
them, to the modern professional account­
ant, growing out of our experience in price 
stabilization accounting. I hope the ac­
countant will recognize that the great im­
portance of the American industrial sys­
tem is that it is the great weapon of the 
free world. It is really the last weapon of 
the free world—how the American com­
panies operate, and their ability to do 
things, to turn out these products that are 
so badly needed. Realize the tremendous 
importance of professional accounting in 
the successful operation of that industrial 
system! I think the day is past when the 
accountant can box off a little area and 
say, “I shall not step outside of that.” Do 
everything posible to support objective 
treatment of technical accounting problems 
when they are a basis of national policy 
and refuse to admit that there is no room 
for continued and rapid progress in the 
accounting area.
I think American accounting, particular­
ly cost accounting, has been overrated. I 
think that it has been given credit for 
being better than it is. I don’t think that 
it has been given as much credit as it 
should have for the progress it has made. 
It is my own opinion that there is just as 
much room for research, for advance, in 
accounting and finance as there is in the 
fields of science and engineering. You 
hear, and I hear, about the great advances 
that come in physics, chemistry, and engi­
neering, and what they will do for the 
world. I insist that the problems and the 
opportunities are all around us. There is 
just as much opportunity for research and 
advancement in the fields of accounting. 
finance, and management.
In conclusion, I should like to leave 
these thoughts: OPS accounting needs the 
full help and cooperation of the Institute 
and of all its members, and we are sincere 
in that request. OPS accounting asks for 
understanding of its problems and the 
chance to have them reviewed on an objec­
tive basis. OPS accounting believes that, 
if accounting is going to hold its gains and 
continue to advance as a basis for national 
policy decisions, leadership must be taken 
by the American Institute of Accountants. 
OPS accounting holds that the time has 
arrived for the American Institute of Ac­
countants to boldly go forth in its most 
important role as The Merchant of Truth
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The current program of the Depart­ment of Defense is being developed and geared to our foreign policy. As 
General Bradley recently remarked, “For­
eign policy is the expression of a nation’s 
instinct for survival. Military policy com­
prises the practices of a people in the 
organization of their . . . resources for 
defense. There is little immediate danger 
of this country being over-run—but our 
way of life, our freedom, and our nation 
have the chance for survival by keeping 
peace in the world.”
This is the overriding consideration of 
our national foreign and military policies. 
These policies are united in three basic 
objectives: first, to protect and maintain 
our form of government and our way of 
life against any challenge; second, to 
seek peace by every honorable means at 
our command; third, to assure peace not 
only for ourselves but for others. For 
these reasons we support the United Na­
tions, realizing that world peace is an 
integral part of American security. These 
guiding principles govern our actions in 
Korea as well as in our North Atlantic 
Treaty efforts in Europe. We joined in 
the North Atlantic Treaty as a collective 
defense effort for mutual security. In col 
lective action we multiply our defense 
strength.
Since June 1950 the efforts of the 
United States in this collective action have 
been to build military strength with an 
intensity of effort equal to any ever 
achieved in this country short of total 
war. The build-up has not been com­
pleted but is well under way.
First, I think it might be helpful if we 
took a look at the primary goal of our 
present effort. Secretary Marshall in ap­
pearing before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee last December put it this way:
“This is a move to place us in a strong 
position from which we can go forward 
rapidly to the extent necessary. This is 
not full mobilization. This is a raising up 
of the whole establishment to gain mo­
mentum from which we can open the 
throttle and go very quickly in any re­
quired direction. In my own opinion, and 
that of my associates, the way to build 
up to full mobilization, if that eventually 
is necessary, is first to get this partial 
mobilization program straightened out and 
put it on a very high level—you might 
say a high plateau—and to do it as 
quickly, effectively, and efficiently as pos­
sible.”
A concise statement of the objectives 
and the atmosphere in which this initial 
policy decision was made appeared in a 
Washington Post editorial at the time of 
Secretary Marshall’s retirement—in these 
words:
“When the present emergency oc­
curred, Secretary Marshall kept his head, 
and resisted the hysterical cry of the full 
mobilizers. For that service alone the 
country owes him a great debt. It was a 
gamble he took, but it was a statesman­
35
36 Financial Information Needed in Today’s Mobilisation Economy
like gamble. Secretary Marshall did not 
want to mobilize men with only broom­
sticks to train with. What he aimed at, 
and what we are getting, is a steady, 
coordinated, and harmonious partial mo­
bilization, with the country wedded to a 
civilian economy as well as to a civilian 
leadership, and an economy which more­
over, can cope with the military services 
as a permanent rather than a spasmodic 
customer.”
This concept carries out General Brad­
ley’s thought that “through proper and 
sustained preparedness by the United 
States and with similar efforts by the free 
nations associated with us, we may avoid 
the period of an all-out war.”
Partial mobilization, under this concept, 
means the maintenance of a military force 
in the neighborhood of 3.5 million men. 
It means providing such a force with 
modern equipment at the earliest prac­
ticable date, together with certain re­
serve and mobilization stocks. It means 
also the early delivery of such additional 
equipment and supplies as would be nec­
essary for them to undertake combat op­
erations if required by action of an 
aggressor.
As most of you realize, the build-up and 
support of forces of this size requires the 
procurement of literally hundreds of thou­
sands of items. The determination of the 
number of items required for the initial 
equipment of forces of a specific number 
of air wings, divisions, or ships is a rel­
atively simple though laborious task. The 
problem, however, of determining the 
quantity of items to be procured for com­
bat consumption in Korea, for the main­
tenance of adequate pipelines, for reserve 
and mobilization stocks is a tremendous 
task. Once the total quantities have been 
determined, individual items must be 
scheduled for desired delivery dates. 
Sources of supply and feasibility of pro­
duction must be ascertained and checked 
against the availability of raw materials, 
some of which may be in critical supply. 
Throughout all of this process the appli­
cation of good judgment is vital.
In undertaking this program certain 
ground rules were established. First, the 
principle was adopted that once the ap­
proved active forces were raised and pro­
vided with modern equipment, and cur­
rent operating stocks were on hand, max­
imum feasible reliance would be placed 
on continuing expansible production 
rather than on huge accumulations of re­
serve and mobilization stocks, particularly 
those stocks which might be subject to a 
high degree of obsolescence.
Accordingly, the basic objective of the 
military procurement program is to supply 
the services, the material, and equipment 
required for the timely accomplishment 
of the respective missions. In doing so 
every effort is being made to see that the 
procurement and delivery of items are 
scheduled in a carefully planned and 
balanced manner to meet the actual serv­
ice needs. At all times the present and 
future productive capacity of industry is 
being given full consideration and plans 
will provide for the maintenance of pro­
duction lines rapidly to expand if that 
should become necessary. Planned pro­
duction schedules for major items of hard 
goods have been prepared and indicate 
for each specific item the plants in which 
the production is proposed as well as the 
quantity and delivery rate expected in 
terms of units. Such schedules are sup­
ported with data to justify the quantity, 
the rates of delivery indicating necessity 
for any departure from a reasonably 
smooth production curve.
More specifically, the military depart­
ments have been directed to adhere to 
the following criteria in the preparation 
of these planned production schedules:
1. Schedules must be realistic. Among 
other things, they are to take into ac­
count conditions in regard to availability 
of facilities, materials, manpower, etc.
2. Procurement programs are to be 
orderly and are to minimize severe, un­
necessary jolts on the economy.
3. Where items are related, the sched­
uling of the easier-to-get items is to con­
form to that of the more difficult.
4. The quantities scheduled are to be 
projected to cover all hard-goods procure­
ment programs financed or to be financed 
from funds of the Department of Defense 
as well as the mutual defense assistance 
procurement programs.
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5. Each military department in deter­
mining requirements is to do so in suffi­
cient detail to identify requirements for 
initial equipment, combat and peacetime 
usage, pipelines, and war reserves, and 
take into account inventory position and 
materiel on order, each giving considera­
tion to the potential capacity of projected 
production lines.
6. In addition to carefully planning pro­
duction schedules with major programs, 
the several programs of the three services 
are to be interrelated one to the other 
and modified where necessary if the com­
posite produces a requirement for mate­
rials, manpower, or other resources in ex­
cess of availability.
In order to insure orderly procurement 
of the so-called soft goods the Secretary 
of Defense established the following 
ground rules:
1. Soft goods are to be planned, or 
scheduled, for procurement only at the 
rate required to meet valid military re­
quirements and in such a manner that, 
wherever practicable, production peaking 
will be avoided by the spacing of deliver­
ies.
2. For items of soft goods for which 
the total fiscal year 1952 procurement ob­
jective for any one military department 
exceeds $2 million, no more than one- 
third of the procurement objective for 
the year shall be contracted for delivery 
during any single quarter. In those cases 
in which the seasonal character of pro­
curement, combat needs, or similar con­
siderations indicate the desirability of con­
tract delivery beyond these limits, such 
deviations will be authorized by the Sec­
retary of the appropriate military depart­
ment.
In addition to specific actions which 
have just been outlined, statutory agen­
cies under the Secretary of Defense, such 
as the Research and Development Board 
and the Munitions Board, are to carry 
out their responsibilities for coordination 
of the programs of the military depart­
ments. Presently a primary responsibility 
is to see that proper emphasis is placed 
upon these programs of items which are 
of the greatest need to the Department of 
Defense as a whole.
The Munitions Board, for example, is 
allocating tools and production facilities 
between the various, and sometimes com­
peting, programs of the services in order 
that those items having the greatest pri­
ority will not be unnecessarily delayed. 
The Munitions Board also has respon­
sibility for coordination between the serv­
ices on all procurement matters including 
the supervision and control over items 
which the services might otherwise seek 
to procure in competition with each other.
All of this is being carried out in close 
collaboration with the Office of Defense 
Mobilization headed by Charles E. Wilson, 
the Defense Production Administration, 
and the National Production Administra­
tion—the latter two reporting to Manly 
Fleischmann. Their task is broader than 
that of defense alone because it is their 
job to provide for the proper allocation 
of production effort between the compet­
ing military and civilian requirements for 
resources. I think you will be gratified to 
know that, other than the healthy and 
vigorous expression of differing opinions 
inherent in a strong democracy, the closest 
cooperation is being developed—in an at­
mosphere where men of good spirit are 
bending their efforts to a common task.
We believe that the basic objectives and 
intent of our plans are sound. The trans­
lation of these basic objectives into the 
hundreds of thousands of items is diffi­
cult. However, by taking advantage of the 
lessons learned through the making of 
costly mistakes in World War II, and 
utilizing the experience of competent per­
sonnel who tackled similar problems dur­
ing that period, early action was taken to 
make a thorough analysis of requirements 
and translate the results into realistic 
schedules. The first results of this effort 
were reflected in the 1952 budget request 
of the Department of Defense where, as 
you may have heard, the initial requests, 
as expressed in dollars, were reduced 
from $104 billion to $60 billion, by the 
elimination of the duplication of items, 
pricing, reduction in estimates of quanti­
ties required and the phasing of deliveries.
Subsequent to the submission of the 
budget a re-review was immediately under­
taken. This will be a continuing process— 
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in fact a substantial number of the sched­
ules have already been revised. Sufficient 
progress has been made in the technique 
to justify the statement that since Jan­
uary—when the expanded program was 
decided upon—more constructive work has 
been done in analysis of requirements and 
scheduling than had been accomplished 
by the end of 1943 in the World War II 
period. A great deal remains to be done 
and we are not satisfied but we believe 
that we are on the right track.
Let me give you an example of the 
application of the analysis and scheduling 
process by using hypothetical require­
ment figures for a specific item which is 
required by the Army, Navy, Marine 
Corps, Air Force, and which is also being 
provided for the free nations through the 
Mutual Assistance Program. Assume that 
computed requirement of jeeps to provide 
sufficient quantities for Korean combat 
consumption, for the initial equipment of 
the forces being activated, for pipeline 
requirements, initial mobilization stocks, 
and combat requirements for an all-out 
war might total 400,000. An analysis of 
these requirements might show that some 
50,000 were necessary for initial equip­
ment and current use of the active forces. 
Another 50,000 might be necessary in or­
der that units which could be deployed in 
combat would have a full pipeline and 
immediate support. This 100,000 figure 
would be considered an immediate require­
ment but we could get by on this limited 
number only if production and expansible 
production lines were in being. As deliv­
eries approach this total we could depend 
on expansible production lines for our 
mobilization and combat requirements.
In this particular item production was 
almost nonexistent a year ago. Today pro­
duction has reached a satisfactory rate. 
This rate will probably be continued for 
another year, after which we would expect 
to keep multiple expansible sources pro­
ducing at a minimum rate. Thus we could 
avoid the accumulation of large and un­
necessary stocks of war and mobilization 
reserves. In many items of military equip­
ment, such as aircraft and electronics, this 
practice could avoid the losses which re­
sult from high rates of obsolescence.
Such reasonable immediate require­
ments might avoid the necessity for large 
scale conversion of industry, raw materials 
are conserved, and there is a lesser im­
mediate need for the taxpayer’s dollars.
As of the moment few items have 
reached this satisfactory production rate. 
In some major items, such as aircraft 
and tanks, it will be months before satis­
factory production rates are achieved. As 
rapidly, however, as planned production 
goals are achieved we would expect to 
apply the principle outlined in the jeep 
example to each major item of equipment 
included in the military procurement pro­
gram.
A moment ago I mentioned the objective 
of providing modern equipment for our 
increased forces. The term “modern” 
would apply to new trucks—it would apply 
to new jet aircraft, which are a far cry 
from the slow, propeller-type aircraft be­
ing delivered to the armed services in 1941, 
to new fire control, guns, and improved 
types of ammunition.
Recent publicity about new weapons, 
new developments in warfare, and optimis­
tic statements on the military application 
of atomic energy may have given the 
exaggerated impression that a quick, easy, 
and inexpensive security might be now at 
hand.
Fortunately, there is enough truth in 
both the weapons developments stories, 
and in the progress reports on atomic 
energy to encourage a very optimistic out­
look for improved American armaments. 
However, until new weapons and new mili­
tary applications of atomic energy are 
available for field use, our national safety 
in the face of attack depends upon the 
improved conventional weapons, in ample 
quantity, and with sufficient trained and 
equipped ground, naval, and air forces to 
use them effectively. As the developments 
now in progress indicate that scientific, 
technical, and engineering problems are 
being solved, the new weapons are be­
coming complementary to conventional 
weapons, and will eventually replace cer­
tain types, to the ultimate improvement of 
our over-all defense program.
Our present research and development 
programs, and our present weapons pro­
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curement programs including those in the 
1952 budget, are taking full advantage of 
promising developments. The procurement 
programs, and the research and develop­
ment programs now being projected for 
future years, are also directed toward this 
end.
Many future weapons may be dramatic­
ally different from our present armaments. 
However, I would like to repeat that we 
must rely upon proved, tested, and avail­
able models to win today’s battles with 
the men presently trained to use them. As 
Secretary Lovett recently remarked, “A 
guided missile on the drawing board or at 
the proving ground can’t win ‘Heartbreak 
Ridge’ in Korea tomorrow morning.”
While, so far, I have emphasized matters 
relating to the administration and manage­
ment of the current program for building 
military strength, it does not mean that we 
are overlooking the long-term need for 
installing improved business practices 
throughout the Department of Defense. A 
good start has been made, under author­
ity recently granted by the Congress. To 
me the potential benefits, both to the gov­
ernment and the taxpayer, are exciting 
and fascinating. Actually, our plans con­
template nothing particularly new except 
the application of proven business methods 
to the financial operations of government. 
The operations of commercial-type and 
industrial-type activities—for example: 
manufacturing arsenals, navy yards, over­
haul activities, printing plants, clothing 
factories, coffee roasting plants, and so 
on—are being isolated and removed from 
the mass of appropriation accounts. When 
so isolated each such activity is given a 
charter similar to that which a state would 
give to a business corporation. Each activi­
ty is provided with its own working capital 
and with a separate hank account. From 
that moment on its operations—manufac­
turing, accounting on accrual basis, cost­
ing—are handled in a manner similar to 
those of private business enterprises with 
the end product costs being billed to the 
military organizational units which are the 
customers of these activities.
Also, inventories of common-use stand­
ard-stock items are being placed under 
item and dollar control. Such inventory 
operations will be carried on—within the 
framework of the military departments— 
in a manner similar to those of a Sears 
Roebuck or a Montgomery Ward, stocks 
of items being maintained for issue with 
the costs thereof being billed currently to 
using activities thus making readily avail­
able a current measure of consumption, 
and providing effective inventory control.
I wish that time permitted a fuller des­
cription of the Department’s plans of this 
nature—and of the tremendous possibili­
ties inherent in the application of modern 
business principles to government opera­
tions. We hope some time, in the not too 
distant future, that we will be able to 
tell you a story of accomplishments that 
will increase your confidence in the ability 
of the Department of Defense and the gov­
ernment properly to manage its business.
So far I have been speaking of the 
defense program in terms of forces and 
production. The program may, however, 
have more significance to this professional 
group if its scope were expressed in terms 
of dollars.
July 1 a year ago almost coincided with 
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. At 
that time the Department of Defense had 
a little over $8 billion of unspent funds to 
its credit in the Treasury. During the 
following fiscal year (1951) Congress pro­
vided $48 billion, making the total avail­
able over $56 billion. During that fiscal 
year, which ended three months ago, the 
Department of Defense actually spent $19 
billion, leaving about $37 billion to its 
credit in the Treasury at the end of the 
fiscal year.
For the current fiscal year Congress will 
probably appropriate approximately $62 
billion, not counting a contemplated sup­
plemental sum for Korean combat con­
sumption. Adding the $37 billion carried 
over from previous years, the total avail­
able to the department for the year will 
be close to $100 billion.
I have mentioned several times the funds 
carried over from year to year. For the 
most part, these carry-over funds represent 
the value of undelivered equipment and 
material. For example, contracts for air­
craft placed in 1951 may provide for 
deliveries in 1953, the manufacturing or 
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construction lead time varying from 18 to 
24 months on aircraft and as much as 
three years on heavy ship such as the new 
aircraft carrier, the USS FORRESTAL. 
In this connection I would like to empha­
size that the beginning of any major mili­
tary build-up, a considerable portion of the 
appropriations provided and contracts 
placed are in the nature of a capital in­
vestment. Once such major capital invest­
ments have been made, the plateau of 
which General Marshall spoke can subse­
quently be maintained at a lesser appro­
priation level than when the program 
initially is undertaken.
Separate and apart from funds appro­
priated to the Department of Defense is 
the military portion of the foreign aid 
programs. There was $5 billion in unspent 
funds to the credit of this program on 
July 1. The Congress will probably ap­
propriate $6 billion for the current year, 
making a total of $11 billion currently 
available. This amount added to the funds 
available for the U.S. military forces 
makes the total available for all military 
purposes something over $110 billion, of 
which some $44 billion is expected to be 
actually expended during the current fiscal 
year. The carry-over of unspent funds into 
the next fiscal year for the Department of 
Defense and the Military Assistance Pro­
gram will be about $66 billion.
The amount of funds to be requested for 
1953 has not as yet been determined, but 
regardless of the level eventually decided 
upon, the actual expenditures in 1953 will 
be somewhat higher than in the current 
fiscal year.
In the federal budget certain items 
closely related to defense are not included 
in the figures that I have just recited. 
Funds for stockpiling of critical materials, 
the Maritime Commission, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, and for the govern­
ment’s investment in increased natural re­
sources call for an expenditure of some $4 
billion. Estimated expenditures for other 
government agencies and interest on the 
national debt will total about $17.5 billion.
While we are on the subject of dollars 
the distribution of effort within the De­
partment of Defense by major categories 
might be of interest. A moment ago, I 
mentioned that the Congress would prob­
ably provide in our regular budget request 
about $62 billion. Of this total about $10.5 
billion will go for the pay, allowances, 
subsistence, clothing, and transportation of 
military personnel. About $13.0 billion 
will be allocated to “Operation and Main­
tenance”. Of this total some $4.5 billion 
will go for the salaries and wages of civil­
ian employees. The balance will go for 
fuel, oil, spare parts and other supplies 
for posts, camps, stations, aircraft, ships, 
and military equipment.
A little over $31 billion will go for the 
procurement of major items of equipment 
such as aircraft, ships, combat vehicles, 
artillery, weapons, and ammunition. About 
$4.5 billion will go for the acquisition and 
construction of posts, camps, airfields, 
warehouses, and piers. The pay and allow­
ances and training of the National Guard 
and reserve forces will take about $700 
million. Research and development will 
take another $1.5 billion. Joint activities, 
together with retired pay and miscella­
neous items such as caring for the pri­
soners of war, will take another $500 
million.
These sums are substantial but unfor­
tunately because of the tensions existing in 
the world today we can expect defense 
expenditures to continue to be heavy in 
the coming years, requiring sacrifices on 
the part of all of us. The Department of 
Defense will do its utmost to carry out the 
program for building up our military 
strength in such a manner as to merit the 
confidence of the country and to make the 
burden as bearable as world conditions 
will permit. There are two good reasons: 
first, we too are taxpayers and second, we 
fully realize that the more bearable the 
burden, the greater the chance for main­
taining adequate defense so long as neces­
sary for the security of this great country 
in which we live.
Brig. Gen. T. R. RAMPY 
is Auditor General of 
the Air Force. It was as 
a civilian that he first 
brought considerable ac­
counting experience to 
bear on the Army Audit 
Division in Washington. 
He was commissioned 
from civilian to Lieuten­
ant Colonel, and in 1948 
went to the Air Force
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"Auditing in the Air Force” is a very 
 appropriate topic for discussion be­
fore this meeting of accountants, as it 
deals with the proper stewardship of pub­
lic funds. Billions are being appropriated 
for our greatly expanded preparedness 
program, which will have a serious effect 
on our national resources. Shortages will 
develop in many areas. We are compel­
led, therefore, to make the most efficient 
use of materiel and personnel so as to 
exact the maximum military strength 
from every dollar expended on behalf 
of our defense efforts. The auditing or­
ganization of the Air Force is imbued 
with this concept. In fact, its members 
are continually stressing the importance of 
getting the “most for our Air Force dollar.” 
Everyone recognizes, of course, that the 
word “auditing” as used in everyday 
conversation, implies the examination of 
financial transactions. It is not so clear, 
however, that auditing also has economic 
implications. When we consider that the 
annual and other reports of audits of ac­
counts and financial records of the busi­
ness world form the basis for important 
decisions by business management, we 
cannot fail to appreciate the invaluable 
role of auditing among our modern busi­
ness practices.
Turning to the subject of auditing 
within the Air Force, let us consider the 
why, what, and when of Air Force audits, 
as well as something of the how from a 
technical and manpower standpoint 
which, I am sure, will be of interest to 
you and every other taxpayer.
You have heard today and on various 
other occasions, discussions of the comp­
troller systems of the Department of 
Defense, and of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force. It has been emphasized that one 
of the objectives of the comptroller in 
the defense establishments is the devel­
opment of better management practices. 
It is understood, however, that the word 
“management” has such a broad mean­
ing that it cannot be copyrighted by any 
one organization. Therefore, it is not 
always a simple matter to explain just 
what a comptroller does that is termed 
“management.” It is relatively simple to 
mention that a comptroller has respon­
sibility for budgets, finance, accounting, 
and auditing. Broadly speaking, it is 
with these financial activities that the 
comptroller may find the means of mak­
ing recommendations or developing pro­
cedures which will produce better man­
agement practices. My particular interest 
lies, of course, in the auditing field.
The comptroller of the Department of 
Defense has stated that it is his policy that 
auditing should be performed as an in­
dependent function at all levels of com­
mand as a direct responsibility of the 
comptroller of the service. The Air 
Force established the Auditor General as 
part of the comptroller organization of 
the headquarters in Washington, effective 
July 1, 1948.
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The Auditor General, therefore, has 
direct responsibility for performance of 
all auditing activities throughout the Air 
Force. This requires a world-wide or­
ganization which, for administrative pur­
poses, is divided into geographical areas 
designated as “districts”. There are six 
districts within the United States. One 
is being organized to cover Air Force 
units in Europe, Africa, and the Middle- 
East portion of Asia. Another district will 
be set up later this year to cover units 
in the Far East, namely Japan, the Philip­
pines, Guam, Okinawa, and certain other 
Pacific areas.
The auditing activities of the Air Force 
fall generally within two broad cate­
gories. One area is that of the records 
of financial and property accounting 
transactions within the Air Force. The 
other category relates to the audits or 
examinations made in connection with 
Air Force procurement contracts.
Actual performance of audits is by 
personnel assigned to and under the im­
mediate supervision of the audit dis­
tricts. Over-all policy direction and gen­
eral supervision are responsibilities of 
the headquarters staff of the Auditor 
General. The Auditor General maintains 
close liaison with the Assistant Comptroller 
of the Department of Defense, who is re­
sponsible for general accounting and audit­
ing policies.
The three audit agencies of the services 
also have a close working relationship 
with a view to development and continua­
tion of uniformity in auditing policies 
and procedures. This relationship in­
cludes a coordination program whereby 
audit responsibility in plants having con­
tracts with two or more services is as­
signed to a single service. Various factors 
may enter into this determination, but a 
major consideration is the dollar volume 
of contracts of each service which may 
require some type of audit examination.
I have just mentioned the close work­
ing relationship existing among the audit 
organizations within the Department of 
Defense. The question is often asked as 
to how the General Accounting Office 
fits into the picture. That office, as most 
of you know quite well, is headed by the 
Comptroller General, who reports directly 
to the Congress. It is a statutory office 
and has certain responsibilities under 
the statutes, one of which is the audit of 
government expenditures. It has some­
what the same relationship to the Con­
gress that a public accounting firm has to 
the board of directors or stockholders of 
the corporation whose books it is exam­
ining. The General Accounting Office 
works very closely with the Department 
of Defense in an effort to avoid and 
eliminate all unnecessary duplication. You 
will be interested to know that much 
progress has been made in that direction.
The audit agencies of the three serv­
ices have the duty of examining accounts 
and transactions of the many varied ac­
tivities within the respective departments 
of the Department of Defense. By work­
ing closely with the General Accounting 
Office, we are able to develop accounting 
and auditing procedures which reduce the 
amount of testing and checking which that 
office is required to do in order to per­
form its mission. Therefore, the better we 
do our job, the less detail work the Gen­
eral Accounting Office has to perform.
At the outset I said that discussion of 
“why”, “what”, “when” and “how” we 
audit might be of interest. The answers 
may be obvious or even well known to 
many, but these questions are actually 
asked by someone in nearly every group 
I meet. So “why” do we audit; that is, 
why is auditing considered a desirable 
thing to do? Broadly speaking of course, 
we say it is a means of protecting the 
interests of the government, but why do 
we think it does this? The answer lies 
in the direct and indirect results ob­
tained. First, audit determines the ac­
curacy of the records and provides op­
portunity for correction or improvement 
where needed; second, it tests the pro­
priety of recorded transactions, thereby 
providing a means of judging the effi­
ciency and integrity of individuals con­
cerned; and third, the knowledge that 
periodic audits will be made causes the 
exercise of greater care in recordkeep­
ing and is a deterrent to improper acts. 
These results we believe to be real, as 
does modern business which considers 
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independent outside audits and internal 
audit organizations valuable tools of man­
agement.
A further logical query then is— 
“what” in this large, complex, world­
wide Air Force is appropriate to be au­
dited? As has been mentioned, there are 
two broad areas; one relates to inside the 
Air Force and the other to outside the 
Air Force, that is, procurement. To be 
more specific, however, the following are 
examples of the types of audits per­
formed within the Air Force:
Property Accounts. This covers the rec­
ords kept by persons charged with ac­
countability for government owned prop­
erty and includes warehouse inventories.
Fiscal Accounts. This covers the records 
of the allotments and obligations of ap­
propriated funds.
Quasi-official Accounts. Included in 
this category are accounts of welfare ac­
tivities, such as motion picture services, 
non-commissioned officers’ clubs, officers’ 
clubs, and various other activities con­
ducted pursuant to statutory authority 
and for which commanders have respon­
sibility for proper operation.
Commissary Accounts. Involves records 
covering purchase, requisition, and dis­
tribution of subsistence for Armed Serv­
ices personnel and their dependents.
In the contract or industrial area, 
“what” we audit is determined primarily 
by the type or form of contract. Broadly 
stated, audits of Air Force procurement 
contracts provide information and data 
for use in judging the accuracy, ade­
quacy, and propriety of cost statements, 
cost estimates, and claims for payment 
presented by contractors. There are many 
forms of contracts but the great volume 
of Air Force auditing is related to two 
general types—one is the cost-reimburse­
ment type and the other is the price- 
redetermination type. There are, of course, 
variations in each of these two types, but 
practically all of them indicate some de­
gree of audit, except that price-rede- 
termination forms of contracts of rela­
tively small amounts do not ordinarily 
justify expenditure of audit time. It 
should be understood that it is not now 
a custom of the Air Force to audit costs 
of straight fixed-price contracts awarded 
pursuant to formal bidding, although in 
rare instances, an audit might be indi­
cated in the case of a straight fixed-price 
contract awarded through negotiation.
When Are Audits Made?
The “why” and “what” have been 
briefly covered. Now “when” are audits 
performed? Auditing of accounts within 
the Air Force, as distinguished from au­
diting of procurement contracts, is quite 
similar to internal auditing within a pri­
vate business. Therefore, when or how 
often accounts and records are examined 
by the internal audit staff depends on 
various factors.
Some of these factors are:
1. Frequency of transactions.
2. Dollar value of transactions
3. Relative importance of the activity, 
and
4. The established history of the rec­
ords and personnel involved.
Although we often set arbitrary mini­
mum requirements as to frequency of au­
diting particular accounts, there are no 
arbitrary limitations. The minimum re­
quirements can be readily changed to 
meet changes in circumstances. In some 
operations, such as the accounts of 
a commissary, frequent, often monthly 
examinations are made because of the 
nature of the activity. A commissary may 
be likened to a super market, as it 
handles all those items which make up 
the family food basket—groceries, meats, 
and produce. Then there are some ac­
tivities which are examined only once a 
year. An example is certain property ac­
counts. Then there are others on two, 
three, four, and six month schedules. 
These schedules are not inflexible and 
when the audit staff or the commanders 
find reason to think an audit desirable, it 
can be performed at any time.
There are also varying conditions which 
govern “when” and how often contracts 
are audited. Some of the considerations 
are:
1. Type of contract
2. Dollar amount
3. Rate of production, and
4. Frequency of pricing negotiations.
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Under the cost reimbursement and 
large-scale price-redetermination forms of 
contracts, it is ordinarily desirable to 
make what is called a “continuous ex­
amination” of the cost records. This may 
require assignment of personnel to full- 
time duty in a particular plant. In some 
cases, the volume of transactions may 
justify only periodic visits in order to 
keep the audit work on a current basis. 
There are, however, many contracts which 
are examined only at the time state­
ments of costs incurred are presented for 
purpose of price revision. In case of 
termination of any type of contract, it is 
usually necessary to make an audit of 
the costs or claim of the contractor as an 
aid in settlement negotiations.
How is Auditing Performed
I also promised to say something about 
the “how” of Air Force auditing. It is 
not my purpose to talk about methods 
and techniques in detail since we try to 
follow the accepted practices of the pub­
lic accounting profession. It may be of 
interest, however, to consider some of the 
steps which have been taken to reduce the 
number of auditors required. The first 
step was to develop higher standards of 
qualification of personnel. Progress has 
been made in that area. Using better 
qualified personnel, we are able to train 
them in the use of selective testing pro­
cedures and in the exercise of sound 
business judgment. Although the same 
principles are being applied in audits 
of procurements contracts as in audits 
of internal accounts of the Air Force, so 
far there has been greater progress in the 
improvement of contract auditing.
At the beginning of World War II, a 
great number of large cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contracts were awarded by the services 
but there were no guides as to just what 
was necessary in the form of auditing. 
There was doubt and confusion, whether 
justified or not, concerning the require­
ments of the General Accounting Office. 
As a result, the government and the con­
tractors did many things which consumed 
the time and almost exhausted the pa­
tience of many people. Gradually, a better 
understanding of requirements has de­
veloped and greater cooperation among 
all concerned is evident. In several in­
stances, it has been possible to develop 
close team work between the internal au­
dit staff of the contractor and the armed 
service auditors whereby each covers 
specific phases for a certain time and 
furnishes reports to the other. This re­
quires a thorough survey and appraisal of 
the accounting procedures and internal 
controls, and the preparation of an audit 
program acceptable to both. Periodic 
tests must be made, of course, to assure 
the continuation of an accepted condi­
tion. Considerable saving of personnel has 
been accomplished and better relations 
exist with the contractors where we have 
been able to develop this coordinated ef­
fort.
It may be well to mention briefly a sub­
ject which has been discussed more than 
any other in connection with the audit of 
contracts. I refer, of course, to the Con­
tract Cost Principles, Section XV of the 
Armed Services Procurement Regulation. 
These cost principles were developed to 
replace various other cost definitions 
formerly used, such as Treasury Decision 
5000, and the “Green Book”. Treasury 
Decision 5000 was used in cost-plus-fixed- 
fee supply contracts by the War Depart­
ment during the war and the “Green 
Book” was used for similar purposes by 
the Navy. As most of you know, there 
were questions of interpretation of these 
definitions not only by administrative offi­
cers and contractors, but also by the Gen­
eral Accounting Office.
The present Contract Cost Principles 
became effective 1 March 1949. They have 
been used with little controversy in cost­
reimbursement type contracts since that 
time by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
There has been some controversy as to 
the application of these principles to 
fixed-price types of contracts, particularly 
those with price revision articles. In the 
absence of any clear definition of cost for 
use in determining costs under such con­
tracts, the audit agencies of the three 
services adopted a policy which provides 
that auditors will segregate costs in ac­
cordance with the Contract Cost Prin­
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ciples. The auditors are required, how­
ever, to recognize any specific contractual 
provisions. The reports of audits of con­
tracts of this nature are used by pro­
curement personnel in negotiating revisions 
of prices. It should be noted, however, 
that procurement officers are not required 
to use the provisions of the Contract Cost 
Principles in arriving at a base cost under 
fixed-price contracts even though the audit 
report shows a segregation based on the 
Principles.
One of the points which I always try 
to cover in discussions such as this is 
that the Air Force does not, and I’m sure 
the Army and Navy do not, require spe­
cific accounting systems to be kept by 
contractors. It is the policy to accept the 
contractor’s system with the least pos­
sible adjustment. Accuracy and equity in 
accumulation of costs is the basic prin­
ciple to be observed. The staffs of the au­
dit agencies of the services are always 
glad to advise contractors regarding the 
accounting and auditing implications of 
their contracts. In some instances, changes 
in accounting systems may be indicated 
as necessary, but the services do not pro­
vide a specific system for use by any class 
of manufacturers.
Another and most important phase of 
the “how” of auditing is manpower. I 
have mentioned that we have tried to 
raise the qualification standard and have 
met with some success, but the number 
of qualified auditors available are not suffi­
cient to meet the demand, as most of 
you know. Although the number of audi­
tors employed by the Air Force is not 
restricted information, the mention of 
them here would be of little value unless 
it conveyed some idea of the actual work­
load. The Congress requires a very de­
tailed justification of our budget require­
ments. Statements showing the number of 
Air Force bases, estimated population of 
each base, and the average number of 
personnel required to perform the audits 
at these installations are prepared based 
on the best available data. It can be 
readily understood, however, that much of 
the data needed to make sound estimates 
cannot be obtained because they must be 
submitted at least one year before the 
beginning of the period involved. With an 
expanding Air Force, it is quite difficult 
to find sufficient personnel to meet the 
needs as they arise. Ceilings and limita­
tions are established by law and by regu­
lation which make the job of adequate 
performance a definite challenge.
The same procedure and situation ap­
plies to the staff available for contract 
audits. The greatly expanded procure­
ment program of the Air Force has 
caused a large increase in the number of 
audit personnel required. As you prob­
ably know, present Air Force procure­
ment is at a rate considerably in excess of 
ten billion dollars a year. This is spread 
among many industrial concerns in the 
form of prime contracts of the various 
types mentioned before. The majority of 
the dollar amount requires some type of 
audit examination.
The impact of the expanded program 
was felt early this year and during the 
past eight months the audit staff has in­
creased about 100%. The present staff is 
approximately 2,000—which is made up 
of approximately 1,400 civilians, 475 offi­
cers, and 125 airmen. A considerable 
number of certified public accountants 
and members of the American Institute 
of Accountants make up this complement. 
Most of the officers are reservists who, ac­
cording to present policy, will have to be 
released at the end of 17 or 21 months’ 
service. We are faced with the problem of 
replacement of these men as well as meet­
ing our present needs for additional per­
sonnel. If we must lose the reserve offi­
cers now on duty, their replacements 
should come from the inactive reserve 
pool approximately three months ahead 
of releases. In other words, reserves who 
are now on involuntary recall might be 
replaced by those who have not yet been 
recalled to active duty. This may appear 
to be, and in fact is, a somewhat harsh 
way of doing things, but the present 
situation indicates the necessity for shar­
ing the burden. In some cases we could 
utilize civilians as replacements to whom 
employers might give assurance of return 
to their jobs at the expiration of some 
stated period. These are just ideas of my 
own and do not represent any established 
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policy of which I am aware. And, of 
course, this is only one of many areas 
where similar problems exist. No doubt 
representatives of the accounting profes­
sion will be called upon from time to 
time to assist the services in solving this 
situation which is becoming more acute 
every day.
Another phase of the “how” of audits 
in the Air Force is—how do we use all 
of this talent we have and want? I ex­
plained earlier that there is a headquar­
ters staff and an operating staff divided 
into geographic districts. Each of these 
districts also has a headquarters office 
which is responsible for supervision of 
auditing personnel in resident offices at 
Air Force bases and contractors’ plants, 
and strategically located branch offices 
where audits are performed on a mobile 
basis. The headquarters offices have three 
divisions: The Internal Audits Division; 
the Industrial Audits Division; and the 
Administrative Division. This corresponds
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to the organizational set-up of the Au­
ditor General Headquarters.
The six districts in the United States 
average approximately 300 personnel 
each. Each headquarters office is headed 
by a district chief who has a staff of 
accountants equivalent to supervising sen­
iors and seniors, with the usual clerical 
assistance necessary to handle correspond­
ence, personnel work, typing, and so on. 
The primary mission of the district is per­
formance of audits through resident and 
branch offices. The district headquarters 
exercises direct supervision over the resi­
dent and branch offices, through assign­
ment of personnel, on-the-job assistance, 
surveys of field performance, current re­
view of reports, and continuous follow-up 
as to status of work assignments. This 
includes review for (1) technical com­
petence of personnel, (2) uniformity of 
application of policies, (3) clarity of 
presentation, (4) improvement of tech­
niques and wordings, and (5) unneces­
sary supporting schedules.
The headquarters supervision of the Au­
ditor General in respect to the districts 
is exercised by the staff located in what 
is called the Headquarters Extension 
Office at Philadelphia, Pa. This office 
operates as a part of the Washington 
office, under the direct supervision of the 
Assistant Auditor General, Colonel Ken­
neth W. Hurst, a member of your organiza­
tion, who was recalled to active duty 
about a year ago. The amount of super­
vision necessary in the operation of an 
expanding organization with many new 
employees, is much greater than that re­
quired in a long-established, going con­
cern. During this growing period, the 
amount of supervision given to field ac­
tivities has, of necessity, been inadequate. 
It is, however, the responsibility of the 
headquarters staff to make periodic sur­
veys of district headquarters offices and 
various resident and branch offices. In ad­
dition, of course, there is the necessity for 
over-all control of the organization and a 
knowledge of the current condition of the 
audit program at all times. This contact 
is maintained through correspondence, 
field visits, reports of operating activities 
from the districts, and through review of 
reports of audits. By these and other 
means, we obtain uniformity of applica­
tion of policies among the districts and 
maintain a progressively higher standard 
of performance. Many of the reservists 
returned to active duty are engaged in 
this top level supervisory work both at 
the Auditor General Headquarters and at 
the district headquarters offices.
I should like, at this point, to repeat 
the use made of the reports of audit. 
First, as to reports of audits within the 
Air Force, these are used by commanders 
and their staffs as a means of determin­
ing the status of accounts, the quality of 
personnel keeping the records, the integ­
rity of individuals involved in transac­
tions, and as a means of developing im­
provements in the operation of their 
activities. The audit reports in connection 
with procurement are generally delivered 
promptly to contracting officers or con­
tract negotiators. In the case of cost re­
imbursement-type contracts, the contract­
ing officer uses the statement of the 
auditor in considering the contractor’s 
claim for reimbursement. Very few dif­
ferences of opinion arise between the 
auditors and contracting officers on these 
contracts. On the price revision or price 
redetermination form of contract, the au­
ditors’ findings are used by negotiators 
and procurement cost analysts as an aid 
in studying the contractors’ statements of 
cost and cost proposals.
I have particularly emphasized this in 
order to focus your attention on the need 
for close cooperation between contractors’ 
accountants and Air Force auditors, as 
well as other service auditors. Contractors 
should try to find out the accounting im­
plications of their contracts as early as 
possible. They should then be able to 
make the records and data available with 
a minimum of trouble and loss of time. 
The less difficult the audit, the less time 
required and therefore the fewer men 
needed. Contractors can often save audit 
time by supplying schedules which they 
can prepare much faster than the audi­
tor who may be unfamiliar with the plant 
or office. Sometimes the facilities, desks, 
lighting, and location of working space 
provided for auditors tend to delay the 
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audit work. In this emergency, when the 
maximum use of manpower is essential, 
the Air Force is constantly seeking ways 
to simplify procedures and get the great­
est possible production from the available 
audit personnel.
This element of teamwork is an essen­
tial part of our capacity to get the job 
done. The American Institute of Account­
ants is to be particularly commended for 
its splendid cooperation in helping us to 
solve complex problems of an accounting 
nature, and in rendering invaluable assis­
tance in our continual search for account­
ing talent.
I sincerely trust that this brief picture 
of auditing in the Air Force has given 
you some conception of the problems which 
we face, particularly from the standpoint 
of manpower, and that you will continue 
to do all within your power to aid in 
this most vital program.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE of ACCOUNTANTS
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
(This List Contains All Books, Pamphlets and Bulletins Presently in Print)
Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure.................................................. $ 1.00
Accounting Trends & Techniques in Corporate Annual Reports (1951 Edition). 10.00
Accounting Research Bulletins
Bulletins No. 1 to 41 and 3 Special Bulletins (44 in all) .......................Each .15
Complete Set of Bulletins (44 in all) .................................................................. 4.40
Accounting Research Bulletin Index.................................................................... .25
Ring Binder for Bulletins ...................................................................................... 1.75
Tentative Statement of Auditing Standards.............................................................. .50
Audits by Certified Public Accountants......................................................................... .50
Audits of Savings and Loan Associations (Revised)................................................ .50
Case Studies in Auditing Procedures (9 in all)............................................. Each .50
Ring Binder for Case Studies...................................................................................... 1.75
Internal Control................................................................................................................... .50
Case Studies in Internal Control (2 studies).................................................Each .50
C.P.A. Examination Questions, Official: May 1948 to November 1950 .............. 2.00
May 1945 to November 1947 .............. 2.00
May 1942 to November 1944 .............. 1.50
Unofficial Answers to Exam. Questions: May 1948 to November 1950 .............. 3.00
May 1945 to November 1947 .............. 3.00
May 1942 to November 1944 .............. 2.50
Professional Ethics of Public Accounting by John L. Carey.................................. 2.00
How to Improve Accounting and Tax Service.......................................................... 1.00
Accountants’ Index
Ninth Supplement (January-December 1950).................................................... 5.00
Eighth Supplement (January 1948-December 1949)...........................   7.00
Seventh Supplement (January 1944-December 1947)........................................ 12.00
Journal of Accountancy Index: January 1923 to December 1940.......................... 2.00
New Responsibilities of the Accounting Profession................................................ 1.00
Origin and Evolution of Double Entry Bookkeeping by Edward Peragallo........  5.00
Twenty-five Years of Accounting Responsibility (1911-1936) by George O. May. 3.00
All of the above publications may be obtained directly 
from the Institute. Remittance should accompany order. 
(Add 3% sales tax if delivered in Greater New York.)
Address all orders to Dept AM.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS
270 Madison Avenue New York 16, N. Y.
